Deliverable D6.4 by Paci, Federica et al.
Network of Excellence
Deliverable D6.4
Security requirement patterns
for Future Internet applica-
tions, and improved modelling
of the scenarios
NESSoS - 256980 1
NESSoS - 256980 2
Project Number : 256980
Project Title : NESSoS
Deliverable Type : Report
Deliverable Number : D6.4
Title of Deliverable : Security requirement patterns for Future Internet applications,and improved modelling of the scenarios
Nature of Deliverable : R
Dissemination Level : PU
Internal Version Number : 0.18
Contractual Delivery Date : 30th September 2013
Actual Delivery Date : 31st October 2013
Contributing WPs : WP 6
Editor(s) : Federica Paci (UNITN), Le Minh Sang Tran (UNITN)
Author(s) : Federica Paci (UNITN), Le Minh Sang Tran (UNITN), Kristian
Becker (UDE), Francisco Moyano (UMA), Carmen Fernandez
Gago (UMA), Riccardo Scandariato (KUL), Koen Yskout (KUL)
Reviewer(s) : Jorge Cuellar (SIEMENS), Marianne Busch (LMU), Marinella
Petrocchi (CNR)
Abstract
Future Internet (FI) applications are the result of composing services and data from different parties.
The development of such kind of applications often involves multiple stakeholders, whose requirements
might partially conflict with others’. This raises the need of new techniques to identify all stakeholders
and their high-level requirements, as well as potential conflicts. Moreover, since these parties do not
necessarily fully trust each other, it is also important to identify potential threats within FI applications.
In this deliverable we present a framework including the modelling and analyses which support the
requirements engineers: (1) in the elicitation of stakeholders and their requirements, (2) in the iden-
tification of potential conflicts among their requirements, and (3) in the identification of potential risks
associated with stakeholders’ assets.
The framework employs and extends the Si* modelling language and UML profile with trust and reputa-
tion constructs. These modelling languages are used as basis to produce a catalogue of patterns that
provides support to the security requirements engineers in identifying possible conflicts and threats.
We also present a systematic methodology to apply these patterns to elicit and analyse security re-
quirements for FI applications.
We further address the system sustainability by taking into account the evolutionary aspect of the
development process. We use change scenarios to express the co-evolution of requirements and
architectures. We model these scenarios by using the extended version of the Si* modelling language.
By prioritizing change scenario instances, software architects can be able to select a suitable solution
(i.e., an implementation choice) that will enable the co-evolution happens while limiting the impact on
the system.
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Executive Summary
This deliverable describes the results achieved by WP 6 in the third year of the NESSoS project. In
this deliverable, we present a framework to support requirements engineers in the modelling and analyses
on security requirements. This framework helps to 1) elicit stakeholders and their requirements, 2) iden-
tify potential conflicts among requirements, and 3) identify potential risks associated with stakeholders’
assets.
The framework provides extensions for modelling languages (e.g., Si*, UML). The extensions are used
as bases to produce patterns that help to identify stakeholders and their relations. The framework also in-
cludes patterns to identify conflicts between security requirements, and to identify potential conflicts from
sharing services, resources, or data with non-fully trusted stakeholders. We further outline a systematic
methodology applying these patterns to elicit and analyse security requirements for FI applications. More-
over, we describe an approach to improve the system sustainability by supporting software architects in
dealing with co-evolution of requirements and architectures.
Hereafter, we summarize the major results in this deliverable.
Modelling language (Section 3) We report the extensions that we proposed to the modelling languages
to represent context and security patterns. First, we extend the Si* modelling language with means
for expressing properties of assets and trust. Analysts can specify for each asset a sensitivity
level and the security properties that should hold for the asset. The trust is incorporated with a
trust level and type of permission granted. These extensions are used to model different patterns
to detect potential insider threats. Second, we present a Unified Modelling Language (UML) profile
that allows the requirements engineer to specify trust and reputation requirements for an application.
We propose an extension to UML in order to help requirements engineers and software designers
to have a clearer understanding of the trust and reputation requirements of the system-to-be. The
extensions are applied to several diagrams: use case diagrams, class diagrams, and deployment
diagrams. Third, we present a meta-model for building context-patterns which include common
structures and stakeholders for several different domains. Then we use this meta-model to describe
context-patterns.
Trust-aware cloud pattern (Section 4.1) We describe our analysis using trust-aware cloud pattern to
evaluate the security of cloud scenarios. We accompany our analysis by templates to systematically
gather domain knowledge about the direct and indirect system environments based on the stake-
holders’ relations to the cloud and to other stakeholders. The outcome of the analysis helps decision
makers to decide if a cloud scenario should be pursued or not.
Patterns for requirements conflicts (Section 4.2) We introduce patterns to identify conflicts in require-
ments models. We consider three types of conflicts: resource conflict, goal conflict, and compliance
conflict. A resource conflict is a situation where different instances of a resource are not enough to
allow different agents to achieve their goals at the same time. A goal conflict is a situation in which
the personal goal of an agent is in contradiction with the goals of the role it plays or when a security
goal of an actor collides with the goal of another actor. A compliance conflict arises when the privacy
policy of the data collector and/or the data processor does not comply with the consent expressed
by a data subject, or to the constraints on the data collection and disclosure imposed by the existing
regulations on privacy and data protection.
Patterns for insider threat detection (Section 4.3) We describe patterns to automatically detect poten-
tial insider threats in a requirements model. An insider threat can comprise the confidentiality, in-
tegrity and availability of an organisation’s asset by misusing the permission granted on the asset.
A pattern-driven methodology (Section 5) We present a systematic methodology that applies patterns
mentioned in previous sections to elicit and analyse security requirements for FI applications. The
methodology includes three phases. First, trust-aware cloud patterns are applied to identify system
stakeholders and the trust relationships among them. Then, a requirements model represented as
a Si* model is generated. Second, different pattern-based analyses are applied to identify poten-
tial problems in the requirements model. Finally, security requirements engineers have to resolve
identified problems and update the Si* model.
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From security requirements patterns to architectural patterns (Section 6) We describe an approach
to support software architects in dealing with co-evolution of requirements and architectures. The
approach prioritizes change scenario instances and exploits the asset and trust information in Si*
model. This information is used to determine the relevance and importance of a change scenario
instance and to select a suitable solution for the scenario. We illustrate the approach using the
eHealth case study from WP11.
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1 Introduction
FI applications are the result of composing services and data from different parties. Such applications
often involve multiple stakeholders and each one has his own requirements. However, different stakehold-
ers might have conflicts between their requirements. Moreover, since these parties do not necessarily
fully trust each other, it is also important to identify potential threats within the FI applications.
Therefore, it raises the need for new techniques to:
• elicit all stakeholders and their high-level requirements,
• identify conflicts among their security requirements,
• early identify potential threats arising from sharing services, or resources, or data between stake-
holders who are not fully trusted.
This deliverable reports the results of WP 6 during the third year within the NESSoS project. The
main artefact of WP6 is a framework to support requirements engineers in the modelling and analyses on
security requirements. Particularly, these results are as follows:
• The extensions of modelling languages (e.g., Si*, UML) in order to elicit domain knowledge (e.g.,
stakeholders), and capture security requirements at different levels of abstraction,
• Patterns to elicit stakeholders and their relations,
• Patterns to identify conflicts in security requirements,
• Patterns to early identify potential threats associated with stakeholders’ assets,
• A pattern-driven methodology to apply these patterns to elicit and analyse security requirements for
FI applications,
• An approach to improve the system sustainability by supporting software architects to deal with
co-evolution of requirements and architectures.
This deliverable is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the case study which is used for illus-
tration purpose and briefs the background knowledge for consecutive sections. Section 3 describes the
extensions in Si* and UML, and a meta-model for context-patterns. Section 4 presents patterns to iden-
tify requirements conflicts, and patterns to identify potential threats. Section 5 outlines the pattern-driven
methodology. Section 6 describes an approach to support software architects in the prioritization of in-
stances of change patterns and in the selection of suitable architectural solutions. Section 7 shows the
relation between this deliverable and other WPs. Section 8 concludes the deliverable. Section 9 lists the
publications of WP 6 in the third year of the NESSoS project.
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2 Background
This section, as name suggested, provides background knowledge for further sections in this deliv-
erable. Section 2.1 describes the eHealth case study which is used for the illustration purpose in later
sections. Section 2.2 presents the basic principle and concept of the Si* language. Section 2.3 briefs
studies in the field of trust and reputation requirements. Section 2.4 describes several patterns that we
have developed for the elicitation of domain knowledge. Section 2.5 discusses the usage of change
pattern for the co-evolution of requirements and architectures of a system.
2.1 The eHealth Case Study
To illustrate the patterns that will be described in later sections, we use the health care record management
and the patient monitoring scenarios. We briefly recall each scenario in what follows.
Patient Monitoring The scenario concerns health monitoring and drugs delivery to patients’ home. The
scenario involves six actors. The Patient is monitored by a smart T-shirt which measures medical data
(e.g., heartbeat rate, blood pressure, etc.) and transfers them to the Hospital’s computer system. When
the patient’s condition is abnormal, the doctor makes a diagnosis and produces a prescription. The patient
receives his prescription and requests the drug delivery service to the pharmacy. The Hospital provides
medical services to patients. The hospital monitors patients’ health and manages patients’ data, which
are stored in the hospital’s computer. When the patient has some problems, the hospital assigns a doctor
to diagnose the patient. The Doctor is responsible to diagnose the patients and prescribe required med-
ications. The Pharmacy sells drug to patients; it is responsible for managing drugs and provide them to
patients. All the information about drugs is stored in the pharmacy’s computer. The Pharmacist works for
the pharmacy and communicates directly to patients to receive prescription from them. The pharmacist is
responsible to provide drugs to be delivered according to patients’ prescriptions. The prescription informa-
tion is stored in the pharmacy’s computer. The Drug manager works for the pharmacy and is responsible
to manage the pharmacy’s computer which stores all the drugs’ information. The drug manager does not
directly communicate to patients. If a patient has any concern to drug delivered for him by the pharmacy,
he can contact the pharmacist instead of the drug manager.
Electronic Health Records (EHR) The scenario concerns managing Electronic Health Records (EHRs)
and is provided by the industrial partners of the EU project NESSoS. EHRs contain any information cre-
ated by health care professionals in the context of the care of a patient. Examples are laboratory reports,
X-ray images, and data from monitoring equipment. The information stored in the EHR shall only be
accessed with the consent of the patient. The only exception is a medical emergency, in which case the
patient’s physical status may prevent her from giving the consent. In addition, the information in the EHR
can support clinical research.
2.2 The Si* Language
The Si* modelling language [47] has been proposed to capture security and functional requirements of
socio-technical systems. We do not introduce here all the concepts and relations of Si*, but just the
ones that are relevant to illustrate our approach. We consider the concepts agent, role, service, and the
relations AND/OR decomposition, means-end, contribution, and delegation and trust of execution and
permission.
An agent is an active entity with concrete manifestations and is used to model humans as well as
software agents and organisations. A role is the abstract characterization of the behaviour of an active
entity within some context. They are graphically represented as circles.
The term service is used to denote a goal, a task and a resource. A goal captures a strategic interest
that is intended to be fulfilled. A task represents a particular course of actions that produces a desired
effect. It can be executed to satisfy a goal. A resource is an artefact produced/consumed by a goal or a
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task. In the graphical representation, goals, tasks, and resources are respectively represented as ovals,
hexagons, and rectangles.
AND/OR decomposition is used to refine a goal, while means-end identifies goals that provide means
for achieving another goal or resources produced or consumed by a goal/task. Contribution is used when
the relation between goals is not the consequence of a deliberative planning but rather results from side-
effects. The impact can be positive or negative and is graphically represented as edges labelled with +
and -, respectively.
The delegation and trust are used to capture the relation between actors. A delegation relation be-
tween two actors marks a formal passage of responsibility (delegation execution) or authority (delegation
permission) from an actor (delegator ) to another actor (delegatee) who receives the responsibility/author-
ity to achieve a goal or to provide a resource. Usually, an actor prefers to appoint actors that are expected
to achieve assigned duties and not misuse granted permissions. Si* adopts the notions of trust of exe-
cution and trust of permission to model such expectations. Trust of execution is a relation between two
actors representing the expectation of one actor (trustor ) about the capabilities of another actor (trustee),
while trust of permission represents the belief of the trustor that the trustee will not misuse a given per-
mission. In the graphical representation, delegation execution and delegation permission relations are
represented by edges labelled De and Dp respectively. Similarly, trust of execution and trust of permission
relations are represented by edges labelled Te and Tp respectively.
2.3 Trust and Reputation Requirements Specification
There are several works that consider security requirements at the early stages of the Service Develop-
ment Life Cycle (SDLC). Some of these works focus on detecting possible attacks on the system [40, 38].
In others, the emphasis is on modelling security requirements, such as confidentiality or authorization.
This is the case of UMLsec [23] and SecureUML [25], two UML profiles that include security constraints
and annotations into the diagrams. Other works aim to integrate the notion of risk into the requirement
analysis stage [27] in order to assess whether the risk level of some unwanted incidents is beyond an
acceptable threshold.
The contributions mentioned up to now focus on hard security requirements or risk, but they usually
lay trust aside. In addition to traditional policy languages for distributed trust management [13, 21], there
are other works that focus on trust in early stages of the SDLC. Mouratidis and Giorgini [29] present
Secure Tropos, a methodology that extends the Tropos methodology in order to enable the design of
secure systems. Actors in Tropos may depend on other actors in order to achieve a goal, and these social
relationships are captured by the methodology. In a similar direction, Lamsweerde and Letier present
KAOS [44], a comprehensive goal-oriented methodology to elicit the requirements of a socio-technical
system. All these contributions put forward the idea of capturing social aspects, but the notion of trust and
its influence on the information systems is barely explored. This is partially covered by Pavlidis, Mouratidis
and Islam [36], who include trust-related concepts in Secure Tropos.
The work by Chakraborty and Ray [14] bridges a gap between traditional security requirements mod-
elling and soft-security considerations by incorporating the notion of trust levels into the traditional Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC) model. These levels are measured by means of a trust vector, where each
component in the vector is a factor that influences trust, such as knowledge or experience.
In general, the aforementioned works usually fail in capturing and making explicit all the trust relation-
ships, and above all, how trust and reputation can be used by the system-to-be. The closest contribution
to our work is the one by Uddin and Zulkernine [43], who present a UML profile for trust called UML-
trust. They provide extensions, as we do, to some UML diagrams in order to represent trust information.
Their approach and focus is, however, different than ours. First, their primary concern is reasoning about
trust scenarios, without making explicit which are the trust relationships in the system. Also, they do not
address reputation, whereas it is a primary concern for us. We also provide more details on how trust
and reputation can be computed and the factors (e.g., variables and attributes) that will be taken into
account for this computation. We also show how trust can influence at the infrastructure level by means
of deployment diagrams. However, our trust analysis is in general at a higher level of abstraction, without
delving into the details of class attributes and methods, which is something that UMLtrust requires. As
a conclusion, we think that both works are complementary and can help each other in providing a more
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comprehensive vision of trust in the system for designers and developers.
2.4 Context-Patterns
In the past we developed a number of patterns for the elicitation of domain knowledge, so-called Context-
Patterns. We describe these patterns, because we show a meta-model for context-patterns in Section 3.3.
The meta-model is based on the analysis of our previous context-patterns, which are presented in the
following. The meta-model supports software engineers to describe further context-patterns.
2.4.1 P2P pattern
Our Peer-to-Peer (P2P) pattern (see Figure 2.1 top) is based upon the P2P architecture from Lua et al.
[26], which is derived from a survey of existing P2P systems. This survey describes P2P systems as
layered architectures that contain at least the following layers.
The Application Layer concerns applications that are implemented using the underlying P2P overlay.
For example, a Voice-over-IP (VoIP) application. The Service Layer adds application specific functionality
to the P2P infrastructure. For example, for parallel and computing-intensive tasks or for content and
file management. Meta-data describe what the service offers, for instance, content storage using P2P
technology. Service messaging describes the way services communicate. The Feature Management
Layer contains elements that deal with security, reliability and fault resiliency, as well as performance and
resource management of a P2P system. All these aspects are important for maintaining the robustness
of a P2P system. The Overlay Management Layer is concerned with peer and resource discovery and
routing algorithms. The Network Layer describes the ability of the peers to connect in an ad hoc manner
over the internet or small wireless or sensor-based networks.
2.4.2 Cloud Pattern
We also briefly introduce our cloud pattern (see Figure 2.1 bottom) [11]. A Cloud is embedded into an
environment consisting of two parts, namely the Direct System Environment and the Indirect System En-
vironment. The Direct System Environment contains stakeholders and other systems that directly interact
with the Cloud, i.e., they are connected to the cloud by associations. Moreover, associations between
stakeholders in the Direct and Indirect System Environment exist, but not between stakeholders in the
Indirect System Environment and the Cloud. The Cloud Provider owns a Pool consisting of Resources,
which are divided into Hardware and Software resources. The provider offers its resources as Services,
i.e., Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), or Software as a Service (SaaS).
The Pool and Service do not require instantiation. Instead, the specialized cloud services such as IaaS,
PaaS, and SaaS and specialized Resources are instantiated. The Cloud Developer represents a software
developer assigned by the Cloud Customer. The developer prepares and maintains an IaaS or PaaS offer.
The IaaS offer is a virtualized hardware, in some cases it is equipped with a basic operating system. The
Cloud Developer deploys a set of software named Cloud Software Stack (e.g., web servers, applications,
databases) into the IaaS in order to offer the functionality required to build a PaaS. In our pattern PaaS
consists of an IaaS, a Cloud Software Stack and a cloud programming interface (CPI), which we subsume
as Software Product. The Cloud Customer hires a Cloud Developer to prepare and create SaaS offers
based on the CPI, finally used by the End Customers. SaaS processes and stores Data input and output
from the End Customers. The Cloud Provider, Cloud Customer, Cloud Developer, and End Customer are
part of the Direct System Environment. Hence, we categorize them as direct stakeholders. The Legislator
and the Domain (and possibly other stakeholders) are part of the Indirect System Environment. Therefore,
we categorize them as indirect stakeholders.
2.4.3 The SOA Pattern
Our SOA patterns concerns domain knowledge for Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA). The following
description is taken from [9]. A SOA spans different layers [9], which form a pattern on a SOA with tech-
nological focus, as depicted in Figure 2.2 on the top. The first and top layer is the Business Domain layer,
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Figure 2.1: P2P pattern (top) and Cloud Analysis Pattern (bottom)
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which represents the real world. It consists of Organisations, their structure and actors, and their business
relations to each other. The second layer is the Business Process layer. To run the business, certain Pro-
cesses are executed. Organisations participate in these processes. These processes are supported by
Business Services, which form the Business Service layer. A business service encapsulates a business
function, which performs a process activity within a business process. All business services rely upon In-
frastructure Services, which form the fourth layer. The infrastructure services offer the technical functions
needed for the business services. These technical functions are either implemented especially for the
SOA, or they expose interfaces from the Operational Systems used in an organisation. These operational
systems, like databases or legacy systems, are part of the last SOA layer at the bottom of the SOA stack.
These layers form a generic pattern, the SOA layer pattern, to describe the essence of a SOA.
In Figure 2.2 on the bottom, we adapted problem-based methods, such as problem frames by Jack-
son [22], to enrich the SOA layer pattern with its environmental context. The white area in Figure 2.2
(bottom) spans the SOA layers that form the machine. The business processes describe the behaviour
of the machine. The business services, infrastructure services, components, and operational systems
describe the structure of the machine. Note that the business processes are not part of the machine alto-
gether, as the processes also include actors, which are not part of the machine. Thus, the processes are
the bridge between the SOA machine and its environment. The environment is depicted by the grey parts
of Figure 2.2 (bottom). The light grey part spans the Direct Environment and includes all entities, which
participate in the business processes or provide a part, like a component, of the machine. An entity is
something that exits in the environment independently of the machine or other entities. The dark grey part
in Figure 2.2 (bottom) spans the indirect environment. It comprises all entities not related to the machine
but to the direct environment. The Business Domain layer is one bridge between the direct and indirect
environment. Some entities of the Direct Environment are part of organisations. Some entities of the
Indirect Environment influence one or more organisations. The machine and the Direct Environment form
the inner system, while the outer system also includes the Indirect Environment.
The entities we focused on for the stakeholder SOA pattern are stakeholders, because all requirements
to be elicited stem from them. There are two general kinds of stakeholders. The direct stakeholders are
part of the direct environment, while the indirect stakeholders are part of the indirect environment. We
derived more specific stakeholders from the direct and indirect stakeholders, because these two classes
are very generic. Process actors and different kinds of providers are part of the direct environment. Legis-
lators, domains, shareholders and asset providers are part of the indirect environment. In Figure 2.2(bot-
tom), the resulting stakeholder classes are depicted as stick figures. For a detailed description of these
stakeholders we refer to our previous work [9].
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2.4.4 Patterns for Requirement-Based Law Identification
We consider legal domain knowledge using a set of law patterns. Commonly, laws are not adequately
considered during requirements engineering [34]. Therefore, they are not covered in the subsequent
system development phases. One fundamental reason for this is that involved engineers are typically not
cross-disciplinary experts in law and software and systems engineering. To bridge this gap we developed
law patterns and a general process for law identification which relies on these patterns [10].
We investigated how judges and lawyers are supposed to analyse a law, based upon legal literature
research. These insights lead to a basic structure of laws and the contained sections and how they relate
to the context of a system-to-be in terms of requirements. One result of our investigations is a common
structure of laws. Based on this structure of laws, we defined a law pattern (see Figure 2.3 left hand). The
law pattern itself is discussed in detail in [10]. Every dictate of justice as part of a law states that every
Addressee, who avoids or accomplishes a certain Activity which influences a Target Subject or a Target
Person), to which an Individual (Target Person) is entitled to, has to comply with law. This information
forms the Law Structure. The artefacts of the Law Structure are generalized in the Classification part.
The addressees of this section are specializations of Person Classifier, the activities of Activity Classifier,
the target subject of Subject Classifier, and the target person of Person Classifier. A Law itself is enacted
by a legislator for a Domain and related to other laws (Law Pattern).
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Figure 2.3: Law Pattern (left) and Law Identification Pattern (right)
To find to the legal context of a system the requirements have to be related to the law pattern. There-
fore, we developed the law identification pattern (see Figure 2.3 right hand). First of all, a Requirement
can be related to other Requirements and dictates a certain behaviour of the machine. A behaviour can
be a certain Activity or a whole Process. A Process consists of different Activities. An Activity involves an
Active Stakeholder and in some cases an Asset. Additionally, an Activity influences a Passive Stakeholder
in a direct way or indirect through an Assets which is entitled to the Passive Stakeholder. In addition As-
sets can be related to each other, e.g. one Asset is part of another Asset. All these relations have also to
be discovered and documented. They form the Core Structure of the law identification pattern. Then the
gap between the terms and notions of the technical world and the terms and notions of the legal world
has to be bridged. Therefore, the parts of core structure have to be classified using the terms of the legal
world. And the context in means of Countries and Domains the system will operate in has to be set up.
2.5 Change Pattern
A change pattern [46] represents a reusable source of knowledge concerning the co-evolution of two
related artefacts. Depending on the type of artefacts involved, there can be many families of change
patterns. For instance, patterns of co-evolution are likely to be found among design and implementation,
requirements and test cases, and so on. We focus on change patterns for co-evolving the (security)
requirements and the software architecture of a system.
When the requirements of a system evolve, the system’s architecture most likely needs to be updated
to accommodate the changed requirements. Keeping the requirements and architecture synchronised,
such that the system at all times fulfils its requirements, is a big challenge for a software architect. Change
patterns can help to achieve this challenge, by providing advice to the architect in the form of a reusable
solution.
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Figure 2.4: Conceptual model of change patterns (expressed in UML)
Figure 2.4 contains the main constituents of a change pattern, and the relationships among them. A
possible change at the requirements level is captured by means of a change scenario, which consists
of a pair of requirements templates that describe, in a generic way, the situations before and after the
anticipated change. To interpret a scenario in the context of a concrete system, a binding needs to be
defined in order to link a requirements template to that system’s requirements model. These bindings
may be defined manually, or they can be found automatically by using pattern matching (such as EMF
IncQuery [12]).
Moreover, the pattern provides a collection of architecture-level solutions. Each solution provides an
alternative way for the system to respond to the change, while minimizing the required effort to evolve
the architecture. Additionally, the principled solutions suggested by a change pattern aim at reducing the
impact (in terms of disruptive change) of the evolution. This is important when the system that evolves
has already been deployed, and recalling the system to carry on major changes to the architecture is
prohibitive. Hence, the use of change patterns helps a software architect in creating a sustainable archi-
tecture.
The solution is composed of a generic architectural template and a transformation called the guidance.
The guidance is specified in terms of the elements of the architectural template, which serves as a refer-
ence point to apply the guidance. A binding between the architectural template and a concrete system’s
architectural model is used to apply the guidance to the concrete system’s architecture. Changing the
architecture (by applying the guidance) may, in turn, necessitate modifications to the requirements model.
To express this, the solution also contains a feedback transformation, which captures the influence of the
architectural changes on the requirements model. Similar to the guidance, the feedback transformation
is specified in terms of a (requirements) template that needs to be linked to the concrete requirements
model by means of a binding.
Figure 2.5 reports a summary of the change patterns that have already been defined for evolving
trust-of-permission relations using Si* as modelling language for the change scenarios [45].
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1. Evolving trust-of-permission from external actor
Situation before change Situation after change
with Initial trust level > Anticipated trust level
Solution 1: Request confirmation;
Solution 2: Enable permission monitoring
2. Evolving trust-of-permission upon external actor
with Initial trust level > Anticipated trust level
Solution 1: Apply least-privilege principle;
Solution 2: Attribute-based access control;
Solution 3: Use permission monitoring
3. Delegate permission to a service to a trusted actor
Solution: Access control
4. Providing additional service with delegated permission
Figure 2.5: Overview of change patterns for evolving trust-of-permission (adapted from [45])
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3 Modelling Language
In this section we discuss our extensions in modelling languages to represent domain knowledge,
requirements conflict patterns and patterns to detect insider threats. Section 3.1 describes extensions
to the Si* language which patterns in later sections are built upon. Section 3.2 presents an UML profile
that allows the requirements engineer to specify trust and reputation requirements for an application. This
involves making trust relationships and reputation information explicit, including the ways they are to be
updated and the interrelations to the business logic of the application. Section 3.3 presents our meta-
model for context-patterns. The meta-model shows a common structure of our context-patterns, which
are introduced in Section 2.4. These patterns support the structured consideration of domain knowledge
during requirements engineering. Software and security engineers can use our meta-model to describe
their own context-patterns. Thus, we contribute a basis for software and security engineers to share their
domain knowledge with other software engineers and security experts.
3.1 The extended Si* Language
The Si* modelling language [47] can only capture whether an actor has a permission (either delegation
permission, or trust permission) on a resource or not but it does not allow one to specify which is the
type of permission the actor is granted on the resource (see Section 2.2). In [5], Si* has been extended
with permission type to represent different types of actors’ permissions on resources. Specifying the
permission type is crucial because it determines the type of actions an actor can perform on a resource.
Some of these actions might be used by an actor to un/intentionally harm a resource. Therefore, we refine
the notion of permission in Si* by introducing three different types of permissions: access, modify, and
manage as described in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Permissions on resource
Permission Type Description (Possible) AffectedSecurity Property
Access
(low-level)
Actor only has the permission to ac-
cess/read/use the resource. Confidentiality
Modify
(medium-level)
Actor can change the content of the
resource. Integrity
Manage
(high-level)
Actor has the permission to modify
the resource, delegate permissions
to other actors and modify permis-
sions to other actors.
Availability
Each permission type determines the set of actions that an actor can perform on a resource. Thus, a
permission type might lead to the violation of a specific security property if the actor misuses the actions
associated with the permission type. In Table 3.1 we show the relation between permission types and
security properties that might be violated if an actor abuses of the permission type. For example, if
an actor has an access permission on a resource, he can accidentally disclose the resource and thus
violate the resource’s confidentiality. In the graphical representation, permission types access, modify,
and manage are respectively represented by suffixes _a, _m, and _ma. These suffixes concatenate the
label Dp or Tp on edges that graphically represent the delegation/ trust permission relations.
In [35], we proposed a further extension to Si* with means for expressing properties of assets and trust.
An asset can be a service (e.g., a goal, task, resource). The owner of an asset specifies a sensitivity level
(VERY LOW, LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, VERY HIGH) and a security property (e.g., confidentiality, availability,
integrity) that expresses the need of protecting the asset. The trust permission relationship is incorporated
with a trust level (e.g., VERY GOOD, GOOD, NEUTRAL, BAD, or VERY BAD) and the permission type granted
(e.g., access, modify, manage).
The sensitivity level and the trust level with which an agent is granted a given permission on an asset
are used to quantify the risk associated with the agent misusing the granted permission to cause harm
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Figure 3.1: Risk Levels
to the asset. The sensitivity quantifies the cost of the threat, while the trust level quantifies the likelihood
that the threat occurs. Intuitively, the higher the sensitivity of the asset, the higher the damage for the
organisation. Similarly, the higher the trust level, the lower the likelihood that the agent will misuse the
granted permission [15]. The risk level can assume the values LOW, MODERATE, HIGH, or EXTREME,
based on the values assumed by sensitivity and trust levels as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
3.2 From Trust and Reputation Patterns to a UML Profile for Trust
and Reputation
FI scenarios usually comprise a huge number of heterogeneous, geographically distributed entities, in-
cluding human users, which must interact to provide services. The complexity of managing security in
these scenarios is aggravated by their dynamic nature, with devices changing, appearing and disappear-
ing along the system lifetime. In these complex and open scenarios, new security requirements need to
be tackled beyond the traditional hard security requirements: confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Trust management is a soft security mechanism [37] that can leverage the security of a system. Even
though there is not any accepted definition of trust, it is agreed that it can improve decision-making pro-
cesses under risk and uncertainty, improving in turn systems security. Reputation, which is a concept
strongly related to trust, can also help in this task. We argue that increasing security in FI applications
entails that trust relationships between actors, applications and system environments cannot be taken for
granted anymore and must be explicitly specified from the very beginning in the SDLC. However, security
requirements engineering methods often do not consider trust requirements, but focus on hard security
ones such as confidentiality or authorization [23, 25]. Even when some social aspects are beginning to
be captured at the requirements stage [29, 44], the analysis of trust relationships is still naive. This could
explain why trust and reputation models have been traditionally added after-the-fact in an ad-hoc fashion,
limiting their re-usability and presenting scalability problems [18].
We advocate that a comprehensive analysis of trust and reputation during the initial stages of the SDLC
is required. For this reason, we propose an extension to UML in order to help requirements engineers
and software designers to have a clearer understanding of the trust and reputation requirements of the
system-to-be.
The performed extensions are the result of identifying trust and reputation patterns by means of a
conceptual analysis [30]. We elicit elements and concepts that are part of most trust and reputation
models and find their relationships. This domain knowledge facilitates the shift from a conceptual domain
to a technical, UML domain.
The extensions are applied to several diagrams:
• Use case diagrams: the goal of the extensions is to depict, at a glimpse, the trust relationships that
exist between the different actors in the system. We also use this diagram to depict which actors
can make claims about which other actors, thus incorporating reputation information.
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• Class diagrams: the extensions to these diagrams provide more insight in trust relationships, includ-
ing how they are represented and how they are updated. They also give more details on claims and
the way to compute them to yield a reputation value about a target entity.
• Deployment diagrams: besides representing the software from the infrastructure point of view, the
extensions to these diagrams show the trust relationships between these infrastructure elements
and their reputation information. Platforms and networks can trust each other and they can even
hold reputation values. This is particularly useful when designing large-scale distributed systems,
where a given processing node (e.g., a mobile phone or a server) can choose among different nodes
in order to collaborate.
We also consider indispensable the use of some behavioural diagram, such as activity diagrams, even
though we do not propose extensions for them. This diagram should represent the interaction patterns
between the trust and business logic of the application, and should make clear which actor initiates a trust
event, how this event is triggered and its consequences. For us, a trust event is any occurrence in the
system that triggers a reputation or trust relationship update.
In order to consider trust and reputation requirements early in the SDLC, we will present next how we
can apply the UML profile to the eHealth case study that was introduced in D11.3 [2]. This case study aims
to collect health-related data independently of the location of the Patient. This is useful for Patient(s), who
can receive immediate feedback under critical situations and be assisted by Physician(s) at any moment
and place. In order to make this scenario feasible, the Patient must wear a device capable of measuring
vital signs (e.g., blood pressure). This device must be able to send this information to other systems that
will show it to Physician(s) for monitoring purposes if there is any problem. For further information about
the actions that can be performed by the Physician and by the Patient, and the original use case diagram,
we refer the reader to D11.3 [2].
We focus now on a possible trust-aware use case diagram, as shown in Figure 3.2. We state that
there is a trust relationship between the Patient and the Physician. The Patient plays a trustor role and
the Physician plays a trustee role. In addition, there is a trusts connector, which is adorned by the context
where this trust relationship is set, namely monitoring. There is another trust relationship between the
Physician (who therefore also plays a trustor role) and the wearable. The Patient also plays the source
role and can therefore make claims (claims connector) about the Physician, who plays in this case the
target role. Please note that we have also added some relevant trust-related use cases. See [31] for more
information on this.
<<trustor>>
<<source>>
Patient
<<trustee>>
<<trustor>>
<<target>>
Physician
Add 
Weareable 
to System
Remove 
Wearable From 
SystemConfigure 
Uncritical 
Alerts Configure 
Critical 
Alerts
Ask Patient 
Consent
Create 
Advice Assign 
Device to 
Patient
Demand 
Immediate 
Read
Ask for 
Urgent new 
Wearable
Ask for 
Second 
Opinion
Ack/Deny 
Consent
See Recent 
Advices
Ask for 
Doctor 
Change
<<trustee>>
Wearable
<<trusts>>
<<trusts>>
<<claimsAbout>>
<<decides>>
<<decides>>
<<decides>>
<<decides>>
<<decides>>
<<decisionCriteria>>
reputation
Rate 
Physician
Set 
Physician 
Preferences
Measure 
Wearable 
Reliability
<<trustContext>>
monitoring
Figure 3.2: Trust-aware use case diagram
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Trust relationships and claims can be further refined in trust-aware class diagrams, as shown in Fig-
ure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 respectively.
<<trustor>>
Patient
{type = human, 
subProp = capability}
<<trustee>>
Physician
{type = human}
<<trustRelationship>>
PatientMonitoring
{context = monitoring,
dimension = 1,
format = quantitative,
scale = [0,1],
default = 0.5}
<<trustEngine>>
PatientPhysicianEngine
{engine = continuous,
variables = (reputation,capability 
belief, trustor's qualityFeedback)}
<<computesTrust>>
<<Variable>>
Capability Belief
{attribute = capability,
scale = [0,1],
source = patient,
how = assigned}
<<uses>>
Figure 3.3: Patient-physician relationship
<<source>>
Patient
{type = human}
<<target>>
Physician
{type = human}
<<claim>>
qualityFeedback
{context = monitoring,
dimension = simple
format = qualitative,
scale = (bad,good)}
<<reputationEngine>>
PatientPhysicianEngine
{engine = average,
variables = (qualityFeedback, time),
display = 3 stars}
<<computesReputation>>
Figure 3.4: Quality feedback claim
In order to specify how the business and trust layers interact, we can define activity diagrams for some
use cases. Figure 3.5 shows an activity diagram for the use case ask for second opinion.
Finally we specify trust information at the infrastructure level. We basically define on which node the
reputation information is to be stored, and how nodes can decide whether to interact with different nodes
according to their reputation.
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Patient Business Layer Trust Layer 
See	  list	  of	  
physicians	  
Retrieve	  list	  of	  
physicians	  
Retrieve	  
physicians’	  
reputa5on	  
Show	  list	  of	  
physicians	  Choose	  physician	  
<<localPostCondition>>
{The list is ordered by physician's 
reputation}
Figure 3.5: Activity diagram for use case ask for second opinion
<<device>>
FrontEndServer
<<device>>
BackEndServer
<<device>>
Wearable
<<device>>
Sensor
Configuration 
Server
Database
Application
Server
<<ReputationManager>>
Reputation Server
{entities=(physician, 
FrontEndServer,BackEndServer)}
<<decides>>
<<decides>>
<<decisionCriteria>>
reputation
Figure 3.6: Trust-aware deployment diagram
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3.3 A Meta-Model for Context-Patterns
Requirements define what properties and functionality a software should have. It is impossible to assess
the quality of a software without requirements. Moreover, writing requirements is only possible if the
domain knowledge of the system-to-be and its environment is known and considered thoroughly. We
address this problem by describing common structures and stakeholders for several different domains in
so-called context-patterns. We show several example patterns in Section 2.4.
In this section, we present a meta-model for context-patterns. The meta-model shows a common
structure of our context-patterns and supports software and security engineers in describing their own
context-patterns. We illustrate this process in an example. This section is a summary of our EuroPlop
contribution [8].
3.3.1 A Meta-Model for Context-Patterns
Our meta-model for building context-patterns considers domain knowledge during the analysis phase of
software engineering. We consider different kinds of domain knowledge, e.g., technical domain knowl-
edge. Therefore, we use a bottom up approach, starting with a set of previously and independently
developed context-patterns.
We identify the common concepts in our existing context-patterns shown in Section 2.4 and aggregate
this knowledge into a meta-model of elements. This is quite similar to what Jackson [22] proposed for
requirements. He defined a meta-model of reoccurring domains, like causal, biddable and lexical domains.
These domains are used to define basic requirements patterns, so-called Problem Frames. In this work,
we show a similar meta-model for context elicitation. We show how we derived it from already existing
context-pattern, and how it can be used to describe the structural part of a new context-pattern.
This meta-model has several benefits. First, it forms a uniform basis for our context-patterns, making
them comparable. Second, findings and results for one pattern can be transferred to the other pattern
via a generalization of meta-model elements. Third, the meta-model contains the important conceptual
elements for context-patterns. Fourth, it enables us to form a pattern language for the context-pattern.
However, in this work we focus on the aspects of the meta-model, which create the basis of a pattern
language for context elicitation.
Using this meta-model we empower requirements and software engineers to describe their own con-
text elicitation patterns, which capture the most important parts for understanding the context of a system-
to-be. Note, that the difference between our meta-model and Tolendano’s [41] meta-pattern is that he
abstracted existing patterns into meta-pattern, while we want to create a meta-model as a basis for a
pattern language for context elicitation.
The meta-model was derived in a bottom up way from the different patterns we described indepen-
dently for different domains. For the process of deriving the general elements, which then form the meta-
model, we started to analyse each context elicitation pattern in isolation. For each element in a context
elicitation pattern we discussed, what the general concept behind this element is or if it is a general con-
cept in itself. Therefore, we set up a table containing the elements of the current pattern to be analysed
as rows and the conceptual elements as columns. For each concept found we checked if this concept
was already covered in the table or not. In the case it was already covered we only added a cross to the
table. In the case it the concept was not covered by a conceptual element, we added a new column. After
iterating over the elements of the pattern, we did a second step by adding the found conceptual elements
as rows and analysing for each of them if they could be further generalized in a reasonable way or not.
This way we found also new conceptual elements. Hence, we had to do the second step several times. If
nothing new was found, we finished the analysis. This way, we obtained the conceptual elements, which
were candidates for the meta-model.
Table 3.2 shows the result of this phase for the SOA pattern. In this case, we analysed two pattern in
conjunction, because the stakeholder SOA pattern reuses many elements of the SOA layer pattern.
In a next phase we harmonized the conceptual elements by comparing the found elements, merging
them if needed and setting up their relations. This way we got a coherent set of conceptual elements over
all patterns.
In the last phase we had to choose, which conceptual elements should be part of the meta-model.
Table 3.3 shows the conceptual elements and in which of the patterns a corresponding element exists.
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General Concept
Layer
Stake-
holder
Pro-
cess
Active
Re-
source
Rela-
tion
Envi-
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ment
Indi-
rect
Envi-
ron-
ment
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holder
Direct
Envi-
ron-
ment
Direct
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holder
Ma-
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Area Re-
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Business Organisations x
Organisation x
Business Processes x
Process x
Business Services x
Business Service x
Infrastructure Services x
Infrastructure Service x
Component-based Service Realization x
Component x
Operational Systems x
CRM x
ERP x
Database x
Packaged Applications x
Legacy Applications x
Participates In x
Performed By x
Relies On x
Exposes x
Business Relation x
S
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
S
O
A
P
at
te
rn
E
le
m
en
t
Outer System x
Indirect Environment x
Legislator x
Domain x
Shareholder x
Asset Provider x
Inner System x
Direct Environment x
Process Actor x
Business Service Provider x
Infrastructure Service Provider x
Component Provider x
Operational Systems Provider x
Machine x
Influences x
Part Of x
Provides x
C
on
ce
pt
ua
lE
le
m
en
t
Layer x
Stakeholder
Process
Active Resource x
Relation
Environment x
Indirect Environment x
Indirect Stakeholder x
Direct Environment x
Direct Stakeholder x
Machine x
Area
Resource
Table 3.2: Analysis of the SOA Layer Pattern and the Stakeholder SOA Pattern Elements
Additionally, we selected for each pattern those elements which were not explicitly part of the pattern
and checked if the missing element is an implicit part of the pattern. The patterns were also tagged with
the information if there is a technical or organisational view provided or a combination of both. This is
important to consider, because there might be elements, which only occur in one of the views. Those
elements might be excluded by just looking at the pure occurrence number, because they can only occur
in a subset of the pattern. But those elements might be nevertheless important to capture aspects which
are special for a view.
The general rule to include an element into the meta-model or not, was to add every element with an
occurrence greater than three, which means the element occurs in more than the half of the patterns. In
case of a view specific element an occurrence of greater than two was sufficient, because the number
of patterns associated with a view was four. Every element with an occurrence of two was subject to be
discussed. The occurrence of an element was calculated only considering the explicit occurrence in a
pattern.
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Type technical technical Technical,
organisa-
tional
technical,
organisa-
tional
organisa-
tional
organisa-
tional
Pattern P2P
Pattern
SOA
Layer
Pattern
Stake-
holder
SOA
Pattern
Cloud
Pattern
Law Iden-
tification
Pattern
Law
Pattern
M
et
a-
m
od
el
E
le
m
en
t
Pattern x x x x x x
Areas x x x x x x
Machine x x x x
Environment x x x x x
Direct Environment x x x x x
Indirect Environment x x x x x
Layer x x x
Process x x x x
Activity x x x x
Stakeholder x x x x x
Direct Stakeholder x x x x x
Indirect Stakeholder x x x x
Resource x x x x x x
Active Resource x x x x
Passive Resource x x x
Relation x x x x x x
un
co
ve
re
d
E
le
m
en
ts
Requirements x x
Requirements leading to P2P x
Requirements Influenced by P2P x
x = contains element x = contains element implicit
Table 3.3: Overview of Elements of the context-pattern and their relation to the Meta-model
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Figure 3.7: context-pattern Meta-model
We had to discuss the conceptual elements requirement and machine. For the machine element it
seemed that it is only part of patterns which mix-up the technical and the organisational view. So the first
reason to include them is that for eliciting the context of a software problem the most usual pattern is one
which mixes the technical and organisational view. This reason was supported by the experiences of the
authors and context-patterns, which are currently developed and studied, but which are not published yet.
A second reason was the fact that the patterns with a more technical view contain the machine implicitly.
For example, for the SOA Layer pattern (see Figure 3.8) the machine is not an explicit model element,
but the extension to the Stakeholder SOA pattern (see Figure 3.9) shows that elements of the SOA layer
pattern directly relate to the machine. We could not find similar evidence for the requirement element.
Moreover, we think that the requirement is part of the phases which follow the context elicitation. For
the P2P pattern we only added them for visualization means. Law Identification patterns are used in an
iterative way. Thus, they are applied after the ideal context without legal restriction is elicited. Hence, this
is a very specific case, which one cannot generalize. As result, the requirement element is excluded and
the machine element added to the context elicitation meta-model.
Finally, we formed the meta-model as depicted in Figure 3.7 out of the selected conceptual elements.
The meta-model was modelled using the UML notation.
The root element is the Pattern itself. Each pattern consists of at least one Area. In general, an area
contains elements of the same kind, view or level. An area can contain other areas to split it up and make it
more fine-grained. An area can be the Machine, i.e., the thing to be developed, or an Environment, which
contains in turn elements that have some kind of relation to the machine, or a Layer, which encapsulates
elements of the same hierarchy level.
The environment can be further refined. There are elements which directly interact with the machine,
captured in the Direct Environment. And there are elements which have an influence on the system via
elements of the direct environment, captured by the Indirect Environment.
An element, which is part of an Area, can be a Process, a Stakeholder, or a Resource. A process
describes some kind of workflow or sequence of activities. Therefore, it can contain Activities. A stake-
holder describes a person, a group of persons, or organisational units, which have some kind of influence
on the machine. A stakeholder can be refined to a Direct Stakeholder, who interacts directly with the
machine, and an Indirect Stakeholder, who only interacts with direct stakeholders, but has some in-
terest in or influence on the machine. A Resource describes some material or immaterial element, which
is needed to run the machine or which is processed by the machine and which is not a stakeholder. A
resource can be an Active Resource with some behaviour or a Passive Resource without any behaviour.
This meta-model has several benefits. First, it forms a uniform basis for our context-patterns, making
them comparable. If a method already makes use of one of the patterns, it is now easy to generalize the
usage to the elements of the meta-model. This enables one to replace a given used pattern by another
one easily. Second, findings and results for one pattern can be transferred to the other pattern via a
generalization to the meta-model elements. Third, the meta-model contains the important conceptual
elements for context elicitation patterns. Thus, it is helpful to know these elements and search for them in
a specific domain when setting up a new context-pattern for a domain. Fourth, it enables to form a pattern
language for the context elicitation pattern. The common meta-model eases relating the patterns to each
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Figure 3.8: SOA Layer Pattern Meta-model
other.
3.3.2 Using the meta-model to describe a context-pattern
After the definition of the meta-model we instantiated it for each of our context-patterns. Thus, we aligned
all of the patterns to the same foundation making them comparable. Additionally, when integrating context
elicitation patterns into requirements engineering methods this can be done in general only referring to
the context elicitation meta-model.
An example of the result of the application of the meta-model can be seen in Figures 3.8 and 3.9.
Figure 3.8 shows the meta-model of the SOA layer pattern. The root pattern element is the SOA Layer
Pattern itself. Business Organisations, Business Processes, Business Services, Infrastructure Services,
Component-based Service Realization, and Operational Systems are instances of the Layer element and
part of the SOA Layer Pattern. Organisation is an instance of the Stakeholder element. Process is a
Process. Business Service, Infrastructure Service, Component, and Operational Service are instances
of the Active Resource. Business Relation, Participates in, Performed By, Relies On, and Exposes are
Relations. As the stakeholder SOA pattern is an extension of the SOA layer pattern, it re-uses elements
of the SOA layer pattern as shown in Figure 3.9. It adds the Stakeholder SOA Pattern as new Pattern
instance. Environment instances are the Outer System and the Inner System. The Indirect Environment
and the Direct Environment of the stakeholder SOA pattern are instances of the Indirect Environment
respective Direct Environment of the context elicitation meta-model. The Stakeholder SOA pattern adds
an organisational view to the technological focus of the SOA layer pattern. Hence, there is a Machine ex-
plicitly. As the pattern is stakeholder centric, it basically adds Stakeholder and their Relations. Legislator,
Domain, Shareholder, and Asset Provider are instances of the Indirect Stakeholder element. For Direct
Stakeholder is instantiated as Process Actor, Business Service Provider, Infrastructure Service Provider,
Component Provider, and Operational Systems Provider. The new Relations added are Influences, Part
Of, Participates In, and Provides. These two examples of the application of the meta-model show that the
meta-model is sufficient for instantiating context-pattern. Each pattern could be described using the meta-
model without any problems. This way we prove that the generalization we did for forming the meta-model
was reasonable.
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Figure 3.9: Stakeholder SOA Pattern Meta-model
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4 Context and Security Requirements Patterns
This section describes reasoning techniques that take advantage on extensions of modelling lan-
guages, which are previously discussed in Section 3. Section 4.1 describes our technique for evaluating
the security of cloud scenarios using trust relationships. Our technique supports the structured elicitation
of relevant trust information and their analysis. The outcome of our work helps decision makers to decide
for or against the use of clouds. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the patterns we have designed to
detect resource, goal and compliance conflicts. Section 4.3 reports the patterns to detect potential insider
threats in a requirements model representing system’s stakeholders and the organisational settings.
4.1 Trust-aware Cloud Pattern
Cloud computing (or short: clouds) provides scalable IT resources. Clouds promise cost savings and flex-
ibility for cloud customers, but cloud customers are reluctant to trust the security of clouds in companies.
The lack of trust in cloud security is caused by the design of clouds: storing and managing critical data
and executing sensitive IT-processes is performed beyond the companies/customers control.
We propose a cloud-specific technique for eliciting and analysing relevant trust relations. The outcome
of our technique helps to decide if a cloud scenario should be pursued or not.
Our work is based on an enhanced version of the cloud system analysis pattern. The pattern defines
stakeholders, technological artefacts, and their relations. We use the pattern to identify trust relations in
the cloud and calculate trust values based on behavioural data of cloud stakeholders. The calculation
uses existing methods and the results are used to evaluate cloud scenarios with regard to security, e.g.,
if a certain IT process can be entrusted to a specific cloud provider. We illustrate our method with an
eHealth scenario.
4.1.1 Cloud Pattern
We proposed patterns for a structured domain knowledge elicitation in Section 2.4. Depending on the
kind of domain knowledge that we have to elicit for a software engineering process, we always have
certain elements that require consideration. For this work we use a specific context elicitation pattern, the
so-called cloud system analysis pattern [11, 7].
We base our approach on Jackson’s work on Problem Frames [22] that considers requirements engi-
neering from the point of view of a machine in its environment. The machine is the software to be build and
requirements are the effect the machine is supposed to have on the environment. Any given environment
considers certain elements, e.g., stakeholders or technical elements. Jackson [22] describes Problem
Frames as follows: “A problem frame is a kind of pattern. It defines an intuitively identifiable problem class
in terms of its context and the characteristics of its domains, interfaces and requirement”.
We were also inspired by Fowler [19], who developed patterns for the analysis phase of a given soft-
ware engineering process. His patterns describe organisational structures and processes, e.g., account-
ing, planning, and trading.
Our patterns for the analysis phase differ from patterns concerning solutions for the design phase of
software engineering like the Gang of Four patterns [20] or the security patterns by Schumacher et al.
[39]. The reason is that we provide a means for a structured elicitation of domain knowledge for cloud
computing systems. We do not provide solutions for the implementation phase of clouds.
We present a short introduction of our so-called Cloud System Analysis Pattern (or short: Cloud
Pattern) [7] in Section 4.1.1. We created the pattern for cloud-specific establishment of an information
security management system compliant to the ISO 27001 Standard.
4.1.2 Cloud Stakeholder Templates
We accompany our cloud system analysis pattern by templates to systematically gather domain knowl-
edge about the direct and indirect system environments based on the stakeholders’ relations to the cloud
and to other stakeholders. We updated the templates with location, cloud deployment scenarios, and
privacy concerns with respect to a previous publication [11].
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Figure 4.1: Extended Cloud Computing Pattern taken from [7]
The first template serves to describe stakeholders contained in the direct system environment, shown
in Table 4.1. The second template describes the stakeholders contained in the indirect system environ-
ment (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.1: Direct Stakeholder Template - updated version from [11]
Name State the identifier of the stakeholder or group of stakeholders, e.g. company name or group of end
customers.
Description Describe the stakeholder informally, e.g., if the stakeholder is a natural or a legal person.
Relations to the
cloud
Describe the input and output represented as relation (line from this stakeholder to the cloud) between
the stakeholder and the cloud, e.g., the kind of data or software.
Cloud deploy-
ment scenarios
State the deployment scenarios the cloud stakeholder demands: public, private or hybrid. Also state
the reason for the particular deployment scenario.
Location State the country the stakeholder works in.
Motivation State the motivation of the stakeholder for using the cloud based on the previous considered relations
to the cloud, e.g., business goals such as profit increase.
Relations to
other direct
stakeholders
For each relation (line from this stakeholder to another direct stakeholder), name the kind of dependency
between the stakeholders, e.g., indirectly influenced by customer-demand.
Assets State the assets of the stakeholder that are already known.
Compliance State relevant laws and regulations for the cloud scenario that are already known.
In addition to our method, we have a hierarchical structure of models, which lets us analyse the cloud
system at different decomposition levels or views.
4.1.3 Trust Background
There has been a huge number of definitions of trust over the years. This is due to mainly two factors: first,
trust is very context-dependent, and each context has its own particularities. Second, trust spans across
many disciplines, including psychology, economics and law, and have different connotations in each of
them. Finally, there are many factors that influence on trust, and it is not straightforward to identify them
all.
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Table 4.2: Indirect Stakeholder Template - updated version from [11]
Name See direct stakeholder template.
Description See direct stakeholder template.
Relations to
other stakehold-
ers
For each relation from this stakeholder to another direct or indirect stakeholder (no line explicitly shown),
name the kind of dependency between the stakeholders, e.g., protected by, controlled by law, implement
laws.
Motivation State the motivation of the stakeholder for having any reason of considering the cloud for its work or
the motivation for having any kind of relation to stakeholders of the direct or indirect environment, e.g.,
protect privacy of citizens or implement concrete laws of an economic community.
Compliance Identify relevant laws as well as regulations based on the indirect stakeholders. Specify and identify the
ones relevant for the stakeholder at hand, e.g., HIPAA.
If we consider some of the trust definitions provided in the literature over the last years, we come up
with certain concepts that repeat in most of them. In Moyano et al. [30], we gathered, structured and
studied the relation between these concepts. Some important notions related to trust are entities, risk,
uncertainty, context and security.
As we are dealing with a cloud scenario and this is quite attached to the notion of service, we stick
with the definition by Olmedilla et al. [33]: ‘trust of a party A to a party B for a service X is the measurable
belief of A in that B behaves dependably for a specified period within a specified context (in relation to
service X)’.
As discussed by Moyano et al. [30], there are different types of trust models. For the purpose of this
work, we are interested in evaluation models. In these models, the factors that have an influence on trust
are identified, quantified and aggregated to yield a trust score. Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show the most
important concepts that are related to these models.
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Figure 4.2: Trust Common Concepts
The notion of trust builds upon the notion of trust relationship. A trust relationship expresses how
much a trustor trusts a trustee by means of a trust value. This trust value may be influence by many
factors, including trustor’s subjective and objective factors and trustee’s subjective and objective factors.
The context is also crucial in determining this trust value.
In order to quantify these factors, we may use different sources of information, including reputation,
first- and second-hand experiences or social information (e.g., the roles being played by the actors),
among others. Evaluation models differ in the types of factors that take into consideration when computing
trust, as well as in the way to retrieve information of these factors.
We can also define subjective factors for non-human entities, such as components or nodes. Trust
computation among these entities can be approached in two different but non-exclusive ways. First, it
is possible to consider these entities as agents capable of holding beliefs and a mental state based on
prejudice or previous experiences. Second, Quality of Service (QoS) and Service Level Agreements
(SLAs) can provide good indicators to determine levels of trust.
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Figure 4.3: Evaluation concepts
The idea is therefore, extending the trust model with some of the previous concepts so as to allow a
trust analysis in the cloud pattern. This is further explained in the next section.
4.1.4 Extending the Cloud Pattern
We improved our cloud system analysis pattern, depicted in Figure 4.4. We included the direct stakeholder
Administrator, who customizes the Cloud Software Stack. In addition, we added Services at the PaaS and
SaaS level of the cloud. These services are not provided by the Cloud Provider, but by a service provider.
The Cloud Developer integrates Services in order to build the Software Product. The End Customer uses
Services that can complement the functionality of the clouds SaaS offers.
Trust and Reputation Template
In order to evaluate this trust, we can collect information using our trust and reputation template (see
Table 4.3). This information will be used as input to a trust metric or trust evaluation procedure, the output
of which will be the trust value between the delegator and the delegate.
Service Template
We use a service template to gather the knowledge regarding the services that both cloud developers and
end consumers can use.
Application to the eHealth Case Study
We instantiate our cloud pattern using the example of the eHealth scenario regarding electronic health
records (EHR)s, depicted in Figure 4.5. The hospital is located in Germany. The Hospital offers a service
to manage EHRs in a cloud computing environment. The hospital orders the development of the Online
EHR Service by the Internal Development Unit. The cloud provider Hulda provides the cloud resources to
implement the service. The Patient stores/changes medical data. The VIP Patient stores/changes also
service request in the medical data. The Patient and the VIP Patient have the same relations to the cloud.
For simplicity’s sake, we do not show the VIP Patient in the pattern. However, the stakeholders have
different instantiations of stakeholder templates. A specific service request is the so-called Additional
Treatment Request that allows the VIP patient to acquire additional medical services or environmental
request like a room with a view towards the hospital garden.
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Figure 4.4: Extended Cloud Computing Pattern
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Figure 4.5: Instantiated Extended Cloud Computing Pattern with an online healthcare scenario
The hospital plans to hire an internal software development unit to develop software for EHR manage-
ment in the cloud and a customized operating system (OS) for the developed EHR management software.
Hence, the hospital plans to outsource the affected IT processes to the cloud to reduce costs and scale
up their system for a larger amount of patients. EHRs are stored in the cloud database, and transactions
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Table 4.3: Trust and Reputation Template
Information This refers to a particular information of a cloud stakeholder or a cloud element
Contracts / obligations Refer to signed contracts that reflect the conditions and liabilities regarding a given task. They provide
trust as the trustor (delegator) is protected by the law, since he knows that the delegatee will be
punished should something goes wrong.
Previous Experience on Task State the delegatee’s previous experience on a task of the same class or just on similar tasks could
be a good indicator that the delegatee will perform well.
Previous Direct Interactions State if the delegator has had previous interactions with the delegatee, we can use the outcome
(successful/failure) of these previous interactions. (e.g., the delegator delegated a different task to
the delegatee and the latter performed it well).
Previous Indirect Interac-
tions
State if the delegator may delegate the task to another stakeholder who, in turn, can delegate the
task to the delegatee. If the task is well performed, the delegator can conclude that the delegatee
performs well in spite of not having experienced a direct interaction.
Previous Direct Observations State previous Direct Observations: the delegator may use the observations made during previ-
ous/current interactions between the delegatee and any other entity/stakeholder.
Previous Indirect Observa-
tions
State previous Indirect Observations: the delegator can consider the observations made by other
stakeholders about interactions of the delegatee with any other stakeholders.
Reputation State if the delegatee has a reputation, which aggregates the opinions of the rest of stakeholders in
the Cloud setting. It requires a long record of interactions.
Membership to a group State if the delegatee belongs to a group with a high or low reputation, inheriting the reputation of this
group.
Role within the organisation State if the delegatee plays one or several roles in the organisation. This role can determine at a
certain extent how well the delegatee will perform the task.
Willingness to the Task Consider the level of motivation that the delegatee presents to do the task. State if she/he is fond of
the task and consequently likely to perform better than if she/he hates it.
Knowledge on the Task State if the delegatee has the required knowledge/credentials/preparation to perform well.
Table 4.4: Service Template
Name State the identifier of the service
Informal Description Describe the goal of the service in an informal way
Location State where the service is geographically hosted.
Deployment environment State the application server onto which the service is deployed.
Preconditions State the conditions that must be true prior to using the service.
Postconditions State the conditions that must be true after using the service.
Input information Indicate what information the service requires as input.
Output information State the outcome produced by the service.
Atomicity State whether the service is atomic or a result of a service composition.
Ownership Indicate who is the owner of the service. It could be an individual, a company or it may be diluted due
to complex compositions from different organisations or individuals.
Properties/Non-Functional
requirements
Properties that the service hold e.g., response time < x seconds.
Compliance State whether the service is compliant with certain laws or regulations (e.g., laws for protection of
personal private information).
Testing/Assurance Indicate whether the service has been through some testing/assurance method.
like transfers of medical information from the hospital to a local physician are processed in the cloud.
The internal development unit creates SaaS systems for the hospital via developing in a PaaS environ-
ment. The internal development unit also integrates the Authentication Service from an external source,
which authenticates cloud customers for the online banking service. This authentication services is of-
fered for numerous cloud services from Hulda and other cloud providers. Hence, allowing a single-sign-on
functionality, when a cloud customer only uses services that use the authentication service.
The internal administrator customizes an OS for a given IaaS offer and installs a web server, application
server and further more. The bank authorizes its internal software department, to design and build the
cloud-specific software according to the interface and platform specification of the cloud provider.
The main goal of the cloud provider, in our example a company called Hulda, is to maximize profit
by maximizing the workload of the cloud. Therefore subgoals are to increase the number of customers
and their usage of the cloud, i.e., the amount of data as well as the number and frequency of calculation
activities they outsource into the cloud. Fulfilling security requirements is only an indirect goal to acquire
customers and convince them to increase the subset of processes they outsource.
The patient is a person, juristic or natural, who uses the EHR services offered by the hospital, which
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allows the patient to view his/her medical data, request procedures, or transfer medical data to other care
providers.
In our scenario, the transactions concerning medical data can be done via the web service the hospital
offers using the cloud. The patient uses also a Multi EHR Service, which collects all transactions from
all EHR of all care providers the patient has. Hence, the multi EHR service provides an overview of the
overall medical situation of the patient.
Basically, the online EHR cloud service is embedded in an environment consisting of two parts, namely
the Direct System Environment and the Indirect System Environment. The Direct System Environment
contains stakeholders and other systems that directly interact with the cloud through associations, e.g.,
the Patient. Moreover, associations between stakeholders in the Direct and Indirect System Environment
exist, but not between stakeholders in the Indirect System Environment and the cloud. For example, the
Legislator Germany is part of the Indirect System Environment. Typically, the Indirect System Environment
is a significant source for compliance and privacy requirements.
We derive the indirect stakeholders required for this scenario based on the instantiation of the Direct
System Environment. The Cloud is located in Germany and the USA. This is the reason for the indirect
stakeholders Legislator Germany and Legislator US. Germany is a member of the European Union re-
sulting in an additional set of regulations. They are described by the Legislator EU that represents a set
of EU regulations.
The hospital has also several contractual obligations, one of which is the Contract VIP-Patient that de-
fines the services for health and comfort the hospital offers to its VIP patients. As examples, we present
one stakeholder template instance for an indirect stakeholder (see Table 4.5) and one for a direct stake-
holder (see Table 4.6).
Table 4.5: Indirect Stakeholder Template: Legislator Germany (cf. [11])
Name Legislator Germany
Description The Legislator Germany represents all German laws relevant for this cloud scenario.
Motivation The German laws try to control the risks of companies (Hulda and Hospital) and to protect
the privacy of the Patients by regulating disclosure of personal data.
Relations to other stakehold-
ers
Controlled by law: The laws have to be obeyed by all stakeholders of the Direct System
Environment.
Compliance The following regulations might be considered:
• Privacy protection: e.g., BDSG
• Risk management: e.g., AktG
Table 4.6: Direct Stakeholder Template: Patient
Name Patient
Description The Patient uses the online EHR service of the Hospital and the multi EHR service of a
third party.
Motivation The Patient wants easy and secure medical data transactions via the hospital‘s cloud
computing offer.
Relations to the cloud InputBy/OutputTo: InputBy medical data, data related to a person, which is required for
treatment of the Patient by the Hospital.
Cloud deployment scenarios The hospital considers using a public cloud, because it offers significant savings in terms
of money. The Patient hopes for a subsequent cost reduction for his/her treatment.
Location The Patient is located in Germany.
Relations to other direct
stakeholders
Has: Hospital as SaaS provider
Assets Medical data and all data related to the person
Compliance The following laws might be of relevance:
• Privacy protection: BDSG Section 3, Section 4, Section 9, Section 11
• Risk management: AktG Section 91, Section 93
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Table 4.7: Service Template: Authentication Service
Name Authentication Service
Informal Description The service authenticates end customers for uses of SaaS offers.
Location The service is hosted in the U.S.
Deployment environment The service is deployed on a server developed by the owning company ThirdPartyTrust. The server
relies upon encryption protocols like SSL for communication with all outside sources.
Preconditions The service requires that end customers have an existing user account with the ThirdPartyTrust Authen-
tication Service.
Postconditions The service will not provide any information about the end customer to the using PaaS service e.g.,
name or birthdate. The PaaS service simply get the information that an end user is authenticated
successfully or not.
Input information The service requires as input the end user credentials and the PaaS service identifier the user wants to
use.
Output information The service produces an accept/reject message to the requesting service as an output.
Atomicity This service is not composed of another service.
Ownership The owner of the service is the ThirdPartyTrust company, which has its headquarters in the U.S.
Properties/Non-Functional
requirements
The service promises an availability of 99.999 percent of the time and a response time < 2 seconds.
Compliance The service is compliant with the safe harbour agreement between the U.S. and the EC.
Testing/Assurance The service has been tested according to the Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) specified in the Common
Criteria.
Table 4.8: Service Template: Multi EHR Service
Name Multi EHR Service
Informal Description The service connects to multiple EHR services in order to provide a medical overview for patients. The
service can also conduct medical data transactions using the different services.
Location The service is hosted in Spain.
Deployment environment The service is deployed on a tomcat application server.
Preconditions The user has to be authenticated using the Authentication Service prior to using the service. The user
also has to provide the authentication information to the EHR services.
Postconditions The service keeps all transaction information and medical data of the patient confidential. The service
also checks the integrity of all transaction information and medical data between all EHR services.
Input information The service has to provide the accounts the multi EHR Service shall use and the information of which
transactions shall be conducted and which medical data shall be stored.
Output information The service provides the results of medical data transactions and inquires, and the updated medical
data.
Atomicity The service uses the Authentication Service.
Ownership This services is owned by the Health Software Solutions company, which has its headquarters in Spain.
Properties/Non-Functional
requirements
The service promises an availability of 99.9999 percent of the time and a response time < 4 seconds.
Compliance The service is compliant to the data protection regulations of the EC.
Testing/Assurance The service has been tested using mutation-based fuzzing techniques.
Evaluation Trust Model
Figure 4.6 shows a high-level view of a generic trust model. The Trust Relation Template (TRT) is used as
an input to the trust model and the output is a qualitative value to tag the corresponding trust relationship.
Figure 4.7 shows a decomposition of the trust model black box in lower-level units or activities that follow
the process from receiving a TRT to the final trust value output.
Trust	  Model	  
TRT Trust label 
Figure 4.6: High-level Generic Trust Model
The first step consists of specifying the relevance of each entry of the TRT. Relevance is determined
by means of weights. This can be done in parallel with another activity, which is to assign values to
the content of each entry in the TRT. These two activities will heavily depend on the scenario and on
the knowledge of the analysts and requirements engineers. It is important to consider the domain and
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Table 4.9: Trust Relation Template: Hulda to the Hospital (cloud provider to cloud customer)
Information Provision of Virtual Machine and the Pool for running an online EHR service
Contracts / obligations cloud service provision contract with the cloud customer
Previous Experience on Task Hulda has generally good experience with the hospital. They always pay their used services on time
and the required resources of the pool only increase slightly every month.
Previous Direct Interactions Hulda acquired information about what kind of software the hospital runs on the cloud in order to
check compliance obligations. The hospital complied promptly with a functional specification of the
online EHR service.
Previous Indirect Interac-
tions
The stakeholders had no indirect interactions.
Previous Direct Observations Hulda observed that all tasks in the cloud are executed with caution.
Previous Indirect Observa-
tions
The hospital was never reported by any other cloud customer for unfair behaviour e.g., excessive use
of cloud resources.
Reputation The reputation of the hospital is excellent. Hulda has never received reports of negative experiences
with this cloud customer.
Membership to a group Hulda is an IT service provider.
Role within the organisation Hulda belongs to larger organisation that sells hard- and software, as well as logistics services.
Willingness to the Task Hulda wants to provide cloud services in order to earn money.
Knowledge on the Task Hulda has a five year experience as a cloud provider.
Table 4.10: Trust Relation Template: Hospital to Patient (cloud customer to end customer)
Information Transaction information in the online EHR service
Contracts / obligations The patient has a contract for medical treatment at the hospital.
Previous Experience on Task The patient has used the online EHR service multiple times and experienced only one minor mistake
in one transaction.
Previous Direct Interactions The patient contacted the hospital to solve issues with an incorrect transaction. The hospital solved
the issues within an hour.
Previous Indirect Interac-
tions
The patient interacted with other patients, who had been treated by the hospital. The other patients
promised that transactions would never fail.
Previous Direct Observations The patient experienced one failed transaction and the hospital solved the issues.
Previous Indirect Observa-
tions
The patient heard from other patients that some transactions failed or were talking a whole day for
processing.
Reputation The reputation of the hospital was excellent in the beginning of the relation to the patient, but this
opinion changed over time, due to ongoing reports of transaction times and failures.
Membership to a group The hospital is part of a consortium of several hospitals.
Role within the organisation The hospital is an experimental company for gaining experience with cloud-based online EHR ser-
vices for the consortium.
Willingness to the Task The hospital wants to perform the task well, in order to gain good reputation, and to proof to the
consortium that cloud-based online EHR is secure and profitable.
Knowledge on the Task The hospital conducts cloud-based online EHR services for two years.
Table 4.11: Trust Relation Template: Patient to Hulda (end customer to cloud provider)
Information Hulda stores the patients’ medial transaction data and medical data, as well as the information of how
often the customer access the online EHR services and for how long. In addition, Hulda knows, which
other online EHR services the patient uses and also the access frequency and durations.
Contracts / obligations Hulda and the patient do not have a contract or obligations to each other.
Previous Experience on Task The patient has experiences that the availability of Hulda’s cloud is excellent.
Previous Direct Interactions Hulda and the patient have no direct interaction.
Previous Indirect Interac-
tions
The patient received a notification once from Hulda stating that the cloud is offline for 2 minutes. Hulda
informed the customer well ahead of time and was offline for online 1 minute.
Previous Direct Observations Hulda and the patient have no direct observations.
Previous Indirect Observa-
tions
The patient observed that the online EHR service conducted every transaction within 3 seconds.
Reputation The patient has also heard from other users of Hulda’s cloud that the availability is excellent.
Membership to a group The patient is being treated by the hospital, who uses cloud-based online EHR services.
Role within the organisation The patient is not part of an organisation.
Willingness to the Task The patient needs to conduct medical data transactions to receive treatment and he/she needs the
medical data to have on overview of their health situation.
Knowledge on the Task The patient is very familiar on how initiate medical data transactions and to look at medical data using
the cloud-based online EHR service.
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constraints on these values. For the example in Table 4.12, constraints could be: w1, ..., wn ∈ [0..1],
w1 + ... + wn = 1 and ci ∈ (0, 1, 2, 3). Domain and constraints influence the following activity: designing
the trust engine.
Figure 4.7: Activities carried out by the Trust Model
Table 4.12: wi refers to weight for that entry; ci refers to a category value.
Contracts / obligations w1 c1
Previous Experience on Task w2 c2
... ... ...
The trust engine is in charge of aggregating the previous information in order to yield a quantitative
trust score. Also, in parallel, we can define a mapping scheme, which basically associates a numeric
interval to a numeric value. This mapping and the labels chosen depend on the range of the engine. For
example, let us assume that we design the engine to be v =
∑n
i=1 wici and we keep the aforementioned
constraints. Our engine would have the range [0, 3] and a possible mapping is shown in Table 4.13.
Table 4.13: Example of a Mapping from Quantitative Values to Trust Labels.
[0, 1) Low trust
[1, 2) Neutral trust
[2, 2.5) Medium trust
[2.5, 3) High trust
The final activity consists of converting the numeric value yielded by the engine in a qualitative, more
human-readable value by using the mapping defined.
Compositional Trust: Propagation Trust Model
In the previous section, we started off without prior trust information, but a relevant option is to use already-
existing trust relationships to infer new relationships. This is the goal of propagation models.
The high-level view of this model is shown in Figure 4.8. The model receives trust values from several
trust relationships and yields a new trust value. Depending on the configuration of the trust relationships,
we may encounter three situations: aggregation, transitiveness and a combination of them, as depicted in
Figure 4.9.
Trust	  Model	  
Trust value 1 
Trust value Trust value 2 
Trust value n 
Figure 4.8: Generic Propagation Model
In the examples, we observe patients that want to know how much they can trust a physician based
on other patients’ relationships.
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The aggregation configuration happens when the patient knows how much other patients trust the
physician, but he has no trust relationships with such patients. A general constraint that we can impose on
this configuration is that the new value cannot be higher than the existing ones, that is, v4 ≤ vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
v1 
v2 
v3 
v4? 
v5 
v2 
v3 
v7? 
v1 v4 
v6 
v1 
v2 
v3 
v4? 
Figure 4.9: From Left to Right: Aggregation, Transitiveness and Combined Configurations
In transitiveness configuration, we have a trust chain among patients. The patient wants to infer a trust
value for a physician based on the trust values along a chain of patients. In this configuration, we can
impose at least two constraints. First, the final value cannot be higher than the value between the patient
and his direct trustee (i.e., v4 ≤ v1). Second, we stop considering values (i.e., feeding the engine with
values) as soon as one of them is below a given threshold, which is to be determined according to the
range of the engine.
When we have both configurations, the model can proceed as follows: first, it determines values using
the chain (v6 in the example); second, it determines the final value (v7) by weighting v1 and v2 with v5
and v6. Another constraint could be that v1 and v2 should count more than v3 as there is no direct trust
information about those two patients.
All the aforementioned activities can be performed to assess trust among stakeholders and services,
where the Service Template would be another input of the trust model.
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4.2 Patterns for Requirements Conflicts
In this section we report the patterns we designed to automatically detect resource, goal and compliance
conflicts. The requirements model is modelled by the Si* language.
4.2.1 Patterns for Resource Conflict Detection
The pattern illustrated in Figure 4.10 captures a situation in which a resource conflict arises because
• a resource is linked by a means end relation to a goal/task provided by different agents and
• the number of agents who consume the resource to fulfil their goals/tasks exceeds the number of
users that can use the resource at the same time.
Figure 4.10: An Example of Resource Conflict
In Figure 4.10, the conflicts occur for the limited resource Wireless Connection that is provided by the
role Telco Provider to the Patient, Hospital, and Emergency Staff role. The Patient role can be played by
the agents Jane, John, Bob, and Kate. The Hospital role can be played by Charity Hospital agent. The
Telco Provider role is played by Telcofone agent. The Emergency Staff role is played by Doctor Jason
and Nurse Allis. The Wireless Connection is a limited resource because only two agents can use the
resource at the same time1. The conflict arises because the Wireless Connection is provided to roles
Patient, Hospital, and Emergency Staff which can be played by three, one, and two agents respectively,
and thus the total number of users who use the Wireless Connection at same time is six which is greater
than the constraint imposed on the usage of the Wireless Connection.
4.2.2 Patterns for Goal Conflict Detection
A goal conflict is a situation in which the personal goal of an agent is in contradiction with the goals of the
role it plays or when a security goal of an actor collides with the goal of another actor.
Figure 4.11 (without the arrows in the rectangle) shows an example of a Si* model, where a conflict
occurs between the main goal of Jane, an agent playing the role of the Patient, and Bob playing the
Doctor ’s role. The conflict arises between the goal Being Treated of Jane and goal Earn Money of Bob.
Jane has delegated the execution of goal Being Treated to the Hospital. The goal is decomposed in three
subgoals Monitor Patient, Manage Patient Data, and Diagnose. The fulfilment of Diagnose is delegated
to Doctor role that is played by Bob. However, Bob wants to Earn Money by enlisting Jane to participate
1This small number is used for illustration purposes in order to be able to use a simple model with only few actors.
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Figure 4.11: An Example of Goal Conflict
in a drug company sponsored clinical trial without her being informed and by prescribing her only drugs
under clinical trial. Thus, the subgoals Enlist Patient in Clinical Trial and Prescribe Drugs under Trial of
Earn Money wanted by “Bob” negatively contribute to the goal Diagnose, and indirectly also to its top goal
Being Treated.
4.2.3 Patterns for Compliance Conflict Detection
A compliance conflict arises when the requirement model does not conform to the consent expressed by
a data subject, or the constraints on the data collection and disclosure imposed by the existing regulations
on privacy and data protection. A number of guidelines and regulations for data protection and privacy
are available [16, 17, 32], which prescribe how individual sensitive data should be collected, stored and
processed. The Fair Information Practice Principles2 (or short FIPs) are widely accepted, which state that
a person’s informed consent is required before the data is collected and the collection should be limited to
the task it is required for and erased as soon as this is not the case anymore. The collector of the data shall
keep the data secure and shall be held accountable for any violation of these principles. In the European
Union, the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC [16] does not permit processing personal data at all,
except when a specific legal basis explicitly allows it or when the individuals concerned consented prior
to the data processing.
Figure 4.12: An Example of Si* model where compliance conflict occurs
We are able to automatically detect compliance conflicts that arise, because a Si* model is not com-
pliant with the informed consent signed by a data subject. In particular, we present here an example of
2http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm
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a compliance conflict where data subject’s information is disclosed to a recipient that is not listed in the
informed consent signed by the data subject. We illustrate such kind of conflict using the Si* model shown
in Figure 4.12, which is related to the management of patients’ health care records. In the model, there are
four actors VIP Patient, Hospital, Doctor, and Researcher. The VIP Patient owns his/her VIP Healthcare
Personal Data and delegates to the Hospital the permission to access it so that the Hospital can fulfil the
goal Provide Treatment. However, the Hospital further delegates the permission to access VIP Healthcare
Personal Data to the Doctor and the Researcher. The Doctor requires access to VIP Healthcare Personal
Data to fulfil its goal Prescribe Treatment, and the Researcher needs access to VIP Healthcare Personal
Data to fulfil the goal to validate his/her research. The model violates the informed consent of the VIP Pa-
tient, which is represented by the Si* model in Figure 4.13. The Figure shows that the VIP Patient wants
to keep his/her resource VIP Healthcare Personal Data confidential, and the VIP Patient only authorizes
the Family Doctor, Emergency Staff, Physician and Hospital to access VIP Healthcare Personal Data.
Figure 4.13: An Example of Pattern to model Data Subject’s Consent
In order to allow the automatic detection of the patterns in a requirements model, the patterns are
specified in the EMF-INCQUERY language. We remind readers to D6.3 [1] for the formalization of the
patterns in the EMF-INCQUERY language.
4.3 Patterns for Insider Threat Detection
In this section we report the patterns we designed to automatically detect potential insider threats in a re-
quirements model representing system’s stakeholders and the organisational settings. The requirements
model is modelled in the extended version of Si* language introduced in Section 3.1.
Since the term “threat" is ambiguous and may have several different meanings, we employ the def-
inition “A threat is a potential cause of an unwanted incident" from [28, chapter 4]. A threat is thus an
initiator of an unwanted incident (i.e., bad event), not the unwanted incident itself. It is also important to
note that a threat does not have to be a human being with malicious intent; a person with good intention
making mistakes may also be represented as a threat.
The patterns capture situations where an agent A is an insider threat for a given asset S with risk RL
because:
a) A is granted a permission PT on the asset S that is sufficient to violate the security property SP
associated with S which has sensitivity level SL and
b) the agent who owns the resource S assigns to A permission PT with a medium-low trust level TL.
As we have explained in Section 3.1, the risk RL associated with an insider threat is given by the
sensitivity level SL of the asset S and the trust level TL with which A is granted the permission PT . The
risk level can assume the values LOW, MODERATE, HIGH, or EXTREME (see Figure 3.1).
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An insider threat can affect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of an organisation’s assets. In
what follows, we introduce the patterns for insider threats to confidentiality, integrity and availability of an
asset.
4.3.1 Patterns of Insider Threats to Confidentiality
Figure 4.14: Pattern to detect insider threats to confidentiality
Legend: The circles denote the asset owner and the trustee while the ovals contained in the asset owner and trustee compartment denote assets.
Dp_a and Tp_a represent delegation permission and trust of permission relations where the permission type is access. Asset is labelled with the
security property that should be satisfied and sensitivity level.
Figure 4.14 illustrates the situation in which the Trustee agent is an insider threat for the confidentiality
of the Asset owned by the Asset Owner agent. This is because the Trustee has:
• access permission on the Asset and
• the Asset Owner has granted the access permission to the Trustee agent with medium-low trust
level on the Asset.
The risk associated with this insider threat is HIGH because the sensitivity level of the Asset is HIGH
while the trust level with which the Trustee has been granted access permission is BAD. Note that there
are several possible instantiations of this pattern based on the sensitivity level assigned to the Asset by
the Asset Owner and the trust level placed by the Asset Owner on the Trustee agent with respect to the
access permission.
4.3.2 Patterns of Insider Threats to Integrity
Figure 4.15 illustrates the situation in which the Trustee agent is an insider threat for the integrity of the
Asset owned by the Asset Owner agent. This is because the insider has:
• modify permission on the Asset and
• the Asset Owner has granted the modify permission to the Trustee agent with medium-low trust
level on the Asset.
The risk associated with this insider threat is MEDIUM because the sensitivity level of the asset is
MEDIUM while the trust level with which the trustee has been granted modify permission is NEUTRAL.
Note that there are several possible instantiations of this pattern based on the sensitivity level assigned
to the Asset by the Asset Owner and the trust level placed by the Asset Owner on the Trustee agent with
respect to the modify permission.
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Figure 4.15: Pattern to detect insider threats to integrity
Legend: The circles denote the asset owner and the trustee while the ovals contained in the asset owner and trustee compartment denote assets.
Dp_m and Tp_m represent delegation permission and trust of permission relations where the permission type is modify. Asset is labelled with the
security property that should be satisfied and sensitivity level.
Figure 4.16: Pattern to detect insider threats to availability
Legend: The circles denote the asset owner and the trustee while the ovals contained in the asset owner and trustee compartment denote assets.
Dp_ma and Tp_ma represent delegation permission and trust of permission relations where the permission type is manage. Asset is labelled with the
security property that should be satisfied and sensitivity level.
4.3.3 Patterns of Insider Threats to Availability
Figure 4.16 illustrates the situation in which the Trustee agent is an insider threat for the availability of the
Asset owned by the Asset Owner agent. This is because the insider has:
• manage permission on the Asset and
• the Asset Owner has granted the manage permission to the Trustee agent with medium-low trust
level on the Asset.
The risk associated with this insider threat is EXTREME because the sensitivity of the asset is VERY
HIGH and the trust level with which the trustee has been granted manage permission is VERY BAD. There
are several possible instantiations of this pattern based on the values assumed by the sensitivity level and
trust level.
The identification of the insider threats and their risk level is based on a set of axioms in Answer Set
Programming (ASP) reported in D6.3 [1]. The modelling and the reasoning based on the above axioms
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Figure 4.17: Example of Si* model - Patient Monitoring
Legend: The circles denote roles or agents, the ovals denote goals, while the rectangles represent resources. R and O represent Request and
Own. Dp_a and Dp_ma represent delegation of permission relation where the permission type is access and manage respectively. Similarly, Tp_a
and Tp_ma represent trust of permission relation where the permission type is access and manage. Services (e.g., goal, task, resource) that are
considered assets are labelled with the security property that should be satisfied and their sensitivity level.
are supported by the Si* tool which is an Eclipse plug-in equipped with a DLV engine. The tool interface
allows to draw a Si* model which is automatically translated into ASP specification. The tool also allows to
input the rules for insider threat identification so that the problem of identifying insider threats is the same
as checking a DLV program that formalize the Si* model and the axioms.
4.3.4 Application to eHealth Case Study
We now illustrate how the patterns can be applied to the eHealth case study. Figure 4.17 shows the Si*
model for the Patient Monitoring scenario. The model consists of five roles: the Hospital, the Patient, the
Pharmacy, the Pharmacist, and the Drug Manager.
Patient (Role) can be played by three agents Bob, Kate, and Jane. The Patient (Owns) the resources
Patient data and Prescription. It delegates to the Hospital the manage permission on Patient data, and it
delegates the access permission on Prescription to the Pharmacy. Pharmacy (Role) can be played by two
agents Pharmacy San Raffaele and Pharmacy Saint Claire. The Pharmacy has the intention (Request)
to fulfil the goal Sell drug which is (AND-decomposed) into subgoals Manage drug and Provide drug:
the fulfilment of Manage drug is delegated to the Drug Manager while the fulfilment of Provide drug is
delegated to the Pharmacist. The Pharmacy (Owns) the resource PComputer.
Drug Manager (Role) can be played by two agents Mary and Ellen. To fulfil the goal Manage drug,
the Drug Manager needs to have access to the PComputer and thus the Pharmacy grants the manage
permission to the Drug Manager. Note that different trustees can be trusted at different trust level for a
same permission on an asset. For example, Mary is trusted at trust level BAD while Ellen is trusted at
trust level GOOD for the manage permission on the PComputer.
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Pharmacist (Role) can be played by two agents Dr Stefano and Dr Alex. In order to allow the Phar-
macist to fulfil the Provide drug goal, Pharmacy grants the access permission on Prescription to the
Pharmacist. Dr Stefano and Dr Alex are both trusted at trust level GOOD for the access permission on
Prescription.
Hospital (Role) can be played by two agents Hospital San Raffaele and Hospital Saint Claire. The
Hospital has an intention (Request) to fulfil the goal Provide medical service which is (AND-decomposed)
into subgoals Monitor patient, Manage patient data, and Diagnose. Some goals can produce or consume
resources. For example, the goal Diagnose produces the resource Prescription. The Hospital (Owns) the
resource Smart T-shirt and delegates to the Patient the manage permission on it.
Let us assume we want to determine all the possible insider threats for the instance of Prescription
asset owned by the Patient Bob. The reasoning based on the patterns introduced in the previous section
reports the following insiders with risk level taken from Figure 3.1 (Section 3.1):
• threat(Dr Stefano, asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription, Bob, Patient),Bob,Patient), confi-
dentiality, MODERATE)
• threat(Dr Alex, asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription, Bob, Patient),Bob,Patient), confiden-
tiality, MODERATE)
• threat(Mary, asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription, Bob, Patient),Bob,Patient), availability,
HIGH)
• threat(Ellen, asset_ instance(service_ instance(Prescription, Bob, Patient),Bob,Patient), availability,
MODERATE)
Dr Stefano and Dr Alex are two insiders which represent MODERATE risks to the confidentiality of
Prescription instance owned by Bob. Pharmacy San Raffaele trusts Dr Stefano and Dr Alex at the trust
level GOOD for the access on the Prescription instance. For agent who has no direct trust relationship with
another agent, we developed rules to compute the trust level between them [35]. We apply those rules
to compute the trust values associated with the trust chain from Bob to Dr Stefano and Dr Alex through
Pharmacy San Raffaele, then both Dr Stefano and Dr Alex are trusted at trust level GOOD by Bob for the
access permission on Prescription. Since the sensitivity of Bob’s Prescription is MEDIUM, the resulting
risk is MODERATE.
Mary is an insider which represents a HIGH risk to the availability of Prescription instance owned
by Bob. Pharmacy San Raffaele trusts Mary at the trust level BAD for the manage permission on the
instance of PComputer owned by Pharmacy San Raffaele. Bob’s Prescription is stored in Pharmacy San
Raffaele PComputer. By computing the trust values associated with the trust chain from Bob to Mary
through Pharmacy San Raffaele, Mary is trusted at trust level BAD by Bob for the manage permission on
Prescription. Since the sensitivity of Bob Prescription is MEDIUM, the resulting risk is HIGH.
Similarly, Ellen is an insider which represents a MODERATE risk to the availability of Prescription in-
stance owned by Bob.
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5 A Pattern-Driven Methodology
In this section we present a systematic methodology to apply the catalogue of patterns presented in the
previous section to elicit and analyse security requirements for FI applications. As illustrated in Figure 5.1,
the methodology consists of three main phases: Requirements Elicitation, Requirements Analysis and
Requirements Feedbacks.
Figure 5.1: Pattern-based methodology for requirements elicitation and analysis
Requirements Elicitation During this phase the security requirements engineer applies trust-aware
cloud patterns to identify the main stakeholders of the system-to-be and the trust relationships between
them. This information is used to build a Si* model where the stakeholders are represented as actors and
trust relationships are mapped to Si* trust of permission or trust of execution relationships.
Pattern-based Requirements Analysis During this phase the security requirements engineer can de-
cide to conduct different kinds of analyses based on the catalogue of patterns introduced in the previous
section. The inputs of this phase are thus the catalogue of patterns and the Si* model, while the output
is a list of identified problems. The list is piped to next phase. For example, if the security requirements
engineer decides to determine if there are goal conflicts present in the Si* models, he will rely on the
EMF-IncQuery engine to query the model and check if the goal conflict pattern is present. If this is the
case, the engine returns to the security requirements engineer, the actors whose goals are in conflict and
the respective goals.
Requirements Feedbacks The security requirements engineer has to resolve the identified problems.
The resolution of problems that have been identified with the pattern-based requirements analysis requires
to update of the Si* model that may trigger another round of requirements analysis. For example, if the
Requirements Analysis phase returns to the security requirements engineer the actors whose goals are
in conflict and the colliding goals, the engineer has to modify the requirements model so that the conflict
no longer occurs, e.g., delete one of the conflicting goals.
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6 From Security Requirements Patterns to Archi-
tectural Patterns
Koziolek defines a software system as sustainable “if it can be cost-efficiently maintained and evolved
over its entire life-cycle” [24]. Sustainability, often also referred to as ‘evolvability’ or ‘maintainability’, is
an important aspect of software development that is becoming of paramount importance for long-living
software systems.
To obtain a sustainable software system, the evolutionary aspects must be taken into account from the
start of the development process. Change patterns [46] have been recognised as a useful approach to
systematically capture and handle evolution of intertwined pairs of artefacts like (security) requirements
and software architecture. In particular, change patterns provide a systematic approach that guides the
security architect in adapting software architectures in response to changes of trust relationships repre-
sented in a requirement model. They capture a particular evolution scenario, and attach architectural
solutions to that scenario. As such, a change pattern provides a re-usable connection between a pattern
of security requirements change (WP6) and patterns for supporting secure architectural evolution (WP7).
When using change patterns, the security architect has to make two important decisions. First, he
has to decide which of the many prospective evolution scenarios (as codified in the catalogues of change
patterns) are actually relevant and important to be further considered in a specific context. Second,
for each of the considered scenarios, the architect also has to select an appropriate solution out of the
candidates that are suggested by the corresponding change pattern.
A current limitation of the change pattern approach is that it does not provide support to the architect
in deciding which evolving change scenarios should be considered or discarded and which solutions
should be selected for these scenarios. Security architects mainly uses their own experience to prioritise
evolution scenarios and to select suitable solutions.
In this chapter, we describe an approach to support the software architect in the prioritization of in-
stances of change patterns and in the selection of suitable architectural solutions. We represent change
scenarios in an extended version of the Si* requirements modelling language proposed in [35]. We fo-
cus only on scenarios in which the trust level with which an agent is granted a given permission on an
asset decreases over time. Then, to prioritise the change scenario instances and to select architectural
solutions, we leverage the asset and trust information represented in the Si* requirement model. The
trust level and the sensitivity of the asset are used to quantify the risk associated with the actor misusing
the granted permission. This risk is then used to determine the relevance and importance of a change
scenario instance and to select a suitable solution for the scenario. We illustrate the approach using the
eHealth case study from WP11 described earlier (Section 2.1).
6.1 Combining Change Patterns and Risk Information
The basic goal of a change pattern is to provide assistance to software architects to create a sustain-
able architecture, by presenting suitable solutions for a specific evolution scenario. We propose here an
approach that should simplify for the software architect the prioritization of instances of change patterns
and the selection of suitable architectural solutions. We only focus here on change patterns for evolving
trust-of-permission relationships, and we use Si* to model the change scenarios. To prioritise the change
scenarios’ instances and to select architectural solutions, we make use of the asset and trust information
represented in the Si* diagrams as presented in Section 3.1. In particular, the trust level with which an
agent is granted a given permission on an asset and the sensitivity of the asset are used to quantify the
risk associated with the agent misusing the granted permission to cause harm to the asset. The risk is
then used to determine the relevance of a change scenario instance and to select a suitable solution for
the scenario.
In the rest of this section, we will illustrate the approach with the “Evolving trust-of-permission from
external actor” change pattern, which is shown in the top row of Figure 2.5. The situation before change
consists of an external party that delegates a permission for some service to the system, and trusts the
system for not abusing that permission. The change scenario describes the degradation of this trust
relationship over time, i.e., the external party no longer trusts the system with the permission. Therefore,
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the trust level that is associated to the trust permission relationship Tp) becomes lower over time.
An architect that wants to use this change pattern has to compare the system’s requirement model and
the change scenario template to identify possible change scenario instances. In particular, the instances
of the change pattern are found by applying pattern matching, where the change scenario template de-
fines the pattern to look for, and the requirements model is the model in which the pattern needs to be
found. This process (usually) leads to multiple matches (instances) for a single change scenario. The ar-
chitect then needs to assess each and every of these matches, to determine which ones are relevant and
important enough to spend further effort on. Hence, there is a need for prioritizing the returned matches.
Second, after a relevant instance of a change pattern has been identified, the architect needs to
choose between the solutions included with the pattern. This choice, as any architectural decision, needs
to take the system context and desired qualities into account. Therefore, the solutions should include the
necessary information to make an informed choice.
In the following two subsections, we explain how the risk associated with a trust-of-permission relation
in the requirement model can be used by the architect for assessing the importance of change scenario
instances and for selecting solutions.
6.1.1 Prioritizing Change Pattern Instances
As mentioned earlier, matching change pattern scenarios with a concrete requirements model can lead
to a large amount of instances (matches). However, not all these instances are equally important. To
prioritise these concrete change scenarios, each instance needs to be assigned a priority value. For the
change patterns that deal with a changing trust-of-permission relationship, a straightforward candidate for
the priority is the risk value from Figure 3.1 that is associated with situation after the change has occurred.
Change scenarios that lead to a high-risk should be considered more relevant than those leading to a
lower risk.
Recall that this risk level is determined by both the trust level and the asset’s sensitivity. For the trust
level, we use the expected trust level (after evolution), rather than the current trust level, because the
purpose of a change pattern is to prepare the system for the occurrence of the change scenario in the
future. Hence, the instances with the highest priority will be those involving very sensitive assets and
actors that become very poorly trusted with their permissions for accessing these assets, irrespective of
their current trust level. These instances should be taken in consideration by the software architect.
Figure 6.1: Concrete situation before the change happened
Example 6.1 Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 represent a possible instance of our example change pattern in
the eHealth case study. In the before situation represented in Figure 6.1, the Patient grants the EHR server
permission for accessing the Monitoring Data resource with trust level VERY GOOD. A possible evolution
scenario is the decrease of this trust level, for example down to BAD. In our case study, this would
correspond to the scenario where the level of trust from the Patient towards the EHR server decreases
over time, for example when the Patient discovers that unauthorised users (a researcher or pharmaceutical
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Figure 6.2: Concrete situation after the change happened
company, for instance) have accessed the Patient’s Monitoring Data. The EHR server is still entrusted
with the permission for accessing the Monitoring Data, but the trust level changes from VERY GOOD to
BAD, as shown in Figure 6.2. As we assume that the Monitoring Data has sensitivity level MEDIUM and the
trust level in the after situation is decreased to BAD, the risk level associated with the scenario becomes
HIGH. Therefore, this scenario will receive a high priority.
Note that, in general, it may not be possible to directly obtain the priority for a change scenario. This
can happen for more complex change scenarios that consider more than one trust relationship at the
same time, for example. For such cases, the scenario definition should be augmented with a rule for
determining the priority. A simple rule could be to take the maximum risk level associated with all the
trust relationships that are part of the scenario. In the current catalogue of change patterns, this is not
necessary, as every pattern considers exactly one trust relationship, and the risk level associated with that
relationship can be directly used.
As final remark, even when no automated pattern matching techniques are used, the risk levels from
the Si* diagrams are still useful with respect to evolution. Indeed, they can be used to pinpoint the most
interesting starting points for manual exploration and matching.
6.1.2 Selecting a Suitable Solution
When presented with a relevant evolution scenario, the architect needs to select a solution that will enable
that scenario to occur while limiting the impact on the system. The solutions for a single scenario may
differ in multiple aspects, including the cost of instantiating them, the (security-wise) guarantees that the
solution can offer, as well as the amount of work that is still required when the system needs to be evolved.
For the architect, it is therefore not always immediately clear which solution from the catalogue is the best
solution in a particular case.
Inspired by the security tactic categories by Bass et al. [6], we therefore propose that each architec-
tural solution of a security-related change pattern is classified as either resisting abuse, detecting abuse,
or recovering from abuse. This classification, in a certain sense, captures the “power” of the solutions.
Solutions that resist abuse provide the strongest guarantees, as they prevent abuse from happening alto-
gether. Nevertheless, they may not always be applicable or desired, and they can be costly to implement.
On the other hand, solutions that only detect abuse mainly serve as a deterrent; by themselves, they
do not prevent any misbehaviour. These solutions provide the least guarantees, but may be easier (and
cheaper) to implement. In between these two are the solutions that can mitigate abuse. While the abuse
may still inflict damage to the system, the implementation of such a solution minimises the impact of this
abuse. This includes solutions that allow the system to (partially) recover from the abuse, for example.
Sometimes, mitigation solutions require being able to detect abuse in the first place.
As in the previous section, we determine the risk level that is associated with the change scenario
based on Figure 3.1. The chosen solution must be strong enough such that it is still appropriate for
the new (lower) trust level. Hence, a solution is assessed based on both its classification and the risk
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Risk→ Low Medium High Extreme
↓ Solution type
Solution resists abuse – ± + ++
Solution mitigates abuse + ± – – –
Solution detects abuse ++ + – – –
Table 6.1: Suitability of a solution given the risk associated with the change (with ‘++’ as ‘very
suitable’, and ‘– –’ as ‘not suitable’)
Pattern ‘Evolving trust-of-permission from external actor’
Solution 1: Request confirmation resist
Solution 2: Enable permission monitoring detect
Pattern ‘Evolving trust-of-permission upon external actor’
Solution 1: Apply least-privilege principle mitigate
Solution 2: Attribute-based access control resist
Solution 3: Use permission monitoring detect
Pattern ‘Delegate permission to a service to a trusted actor’
Solution: Access control resist
Pattern ‘Providing additional service with delegated permission’
(no architectural solutions)
Table 6.2: Classification of the solutions for change patterns involving trust-of-permission rela-
tionships
level associated with the scenario, where high-risk scenarios demand powerful solutions, while low-risk
scenarios lead to less stringent solutions. A proposal for the suitability of a solution with respect to the
risk of the scenario can be found in Table 6.1.
Example 6.2 For the first change pattern in Figure 2.5, two architectural solutions are suggested:
1. Request confirmation The system requests confirmation from the external actor each time it uses
its permission for the service. This confirmation can, for instance, be a time-limited token that grants
access to the service. This allows the external actor to revoke the permission at any time, or to
revoke specific requests based on the information included in them.
2. Enable permission monitoring The usage of the granted permission by the system is monitored
by the external actor (or an actor appointed by that external actor) to detect any misbehaviour.
By inspecting the obtained information, it can be determined whether the system has abused its
permission.
We classify the first solution (requesting confirmation) as one that resists abuse, and the second
solution (enabling permission monitoring) as one that detects abuse.
In our case study, the change scenario instance illustrated in Example 1 leads to a situation with a
HIGH risk level. Applying Table 6.1 to this case, we see that a ‘high’ risk level indicates that a resistive
solution is more preferable. As a consequence, from the two architectural solutions presented above, the
first solution is more applicable for this scenario. Hence, the architect may implement this solution by
instantiating a service that issues one-time tokens (on behalf of the Patient) whenever the EHR system
wants to access that Patient’s Monitoring Data. These tokens can be issued based on the Patient’s
preferences and consent (e.g., the Patient’s desire to share Monitoring Data for research purposes).
We have used only one change pattern as an example in this section, but the solution categories also
apply to other change patterns. Table 6.2 shows the assignment of the solution categories to the change
patterns from Figure 2.5.
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6.2 Discussion
This section provides some noteworthy remarks on the presented approach.
Applicability The approach presented in this chapter relies on the presence of risk-, trust- and sensitivity-
related information in a Si* model. As far as we know, Si* is the only notation that has explicitly incorpo-
rated this information. While this approach relies on the usage of these enriched Si* models, we believe
that it can also be applied using other kinds of requirement models if they incorporate similar information.
We believe it is realistic to expect risk-related information to become a part of other types of requirement
models as well, because this information identifies the most critical or least trusted parts of the system,
and hence conveys important information.
Other architectural constraints The explanation in Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 may appear to suggest
that the selection of relevant change pattern instances and adequate solutions is reduced to an algorithmic
exercise, and can be completely automated. However, this is not the case. After the architect is presented
with the (prioritised) list of change pattern instances, he still needs to select the relevant instances for
which the system will provide support. This choice should be based on more factors than just the risk
level, for example the likelihood and cost of that particular scenario in the context of the concrete system. It
should be noted that the risk information does not reflect these other factors. This means that the architect
is not expected to just blindly proceed with the high-risk instances, but he should make a conscious choice
based on additional contextual information about the system. Similarly, when selecting a solution, other
factors than the risk may favour one solution over the other. Hence, we stress that the proposed approach
provides valuable support to the architect, but does not take over (or has the ambition to automate) the
core responsibilities of the architect.
Change scenario variants In the conceptual model (Figure 2.4), a change pattern captures a single
change scenario. For the patterns presented in this chapter, this single change scenario represents the
change of one trust relationship in a particular agent and resource configuration. The presence of the
sensitivity and trust levels, however, can also be interpreted as specifying multiple variants of that same
scenario. In particular, these variants are differentiated by the initial and final trust levels and the resource
sensitivity level, for example one variant where trust decreases from GOOD to BAD for a resource with
HIGH sensitivity, and another where trust decreases from VERY GOOD to VERY BAD for a resource with
LOW sensitivity. Conceptually, however, all variants represent the same change scenario (a decrease
of trust), and are thus bundled within the same change scenario (and the same change pattern). The
description of the solutions could still refer to the particular variants of the scenario for which the solution
is best suited, following our proposal described in Section 6.1.2.
Benefits for pattern authors The author of a change pattern needs to describe the solutions that are
attached to the change scenario of the pattern. It is in the interest of the users of the pattern (the architects)
that the set of solutions is complete, i.e., it covers all possible strategies to deal with the occurrence of
the change scenario. To accomplish this, mapping the architectural solutions to the categories described
in Section 6.1.2 can be a useful technique for a pattern author, as the mapping may trigger additional
explorations in order to find missing solutions.
For example, the pattern ‘evolving trust-of-permission from external actor’, which was used as an
example in this chapter, currently contains solutions that resist and detect abuse, but no solution that
mitigates abuse. A possible solution for mitigation is the use of a trusted third party, which controls the
sensitive resource and acts as a mediator between the external party and the system. For example, in the
case of credit cards, an online shop can choose to integrate with a service such as PayPal for customers
that do not want to provide their credit card details directly to the shop (because they are afraid that the
shop’s database may be compromised, for instance). Instead, because the customers do trust PayPal
with their credit card information, they can still use the online shop.
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7 Relations to other Work Packages
In this section, we give an overview of the relations with other work packages.
WP7 - Secure service architectures and design The cloud pattern is built upon the Cloud Analysis
Pattern [11] proposed in WP7. In this deliverable, we use it as a basis for creating a method for calculating
trust values in cloud computing scenarios. Moreover, one of our work in the third year by Moyano et al.
[31] proposes a UML profile for trust and reputation so that requirements engineer can specify trust and
reputation requirements. Using this profile helps to define trust at nodes and components running on
these nodes, which provides a valuable input for the framework presented in D7.4 [4]. This framework
allows developers to integrate trust and reputation models as part of self-adaptive applications. These
applications can then use trust and reputation information to make self-reconfiguration decisions, such as
removing a node or changing communication channels among components at runtime.
WP10: Risk and cost aware SDLC. The FI applications have to deal with evolution and changes as one
of the important challenges. In this deliverable, we address the system sustainability (which is referred to
as evolvability and maintainability) by aiding the architect in the decision making for a suitable solution.
We propose the combination of change patterns and risk information to facilitate the solution selection
that will enable the changes happen while limiting the impact on the system. Also focusing on the solution
selection, the work by Tran [42] proposed an approach to early deal with evolving risks that emerge from
the changes of system requirements. This work was presented in D10.4 [3].
WP11 - Future Internet application scenarios The scientific contributions presented in this deliverable
have been exemplified on the eHealth case study introduced in D11.3 [2].
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8 Conclusions
This deliverable reports the results of WP 6 in the third year of the NESSoS project. We present a
framework that supports requirements engineers with modelling and analyses. The framework consists of
patterns to elicit stakeholders and their relations, patterns to identify requirements conflicts, and patterns
to identify potential threats. We provide extensions to modelling languages (e.g., Si*, UML) to model such
patterns.
We propose a meta-model to capture cloud pattern to facilitate the requirements elicitation. We provide
several extensions to existing modelling languages, i.e., Si* and UML to capture trust and reputation in
requirements. We advocate that, in order to address the security requirements of FI applications, there is
the need to make trust information explicit at an early stage in the SDLC. This involves three activities:
first, specifying the potential trust relationships among the entities of the application; second, depicting
reputation information about these entities, such as which entities can make claims about which other
entities; finally, defining the interaction patterns between the business layer and the trust layer.
Based on the extensions on Si* language, we describe several patterns to perform analysis on re-
quirements model based on trust and reputation. In particular, these patterns help to identify potential
problems in requirements models such as requirements conflicts, and potential threats in FI applications.
Furthermore, we use the extensions to the Si* language to extend the change patterns approach,
which guides software architects with the co-evolution of requirements and architectures. The combination
of this trust information and patterns is used to support the software architects, by prioritizing potential
evolution scenarios and guiding the selection of a suitable architectural design that can cope with these
evolution scenarios. This approach can be employed to address the sustainability for FI applications.
As part of future work, we continue to develop the pattern-driven methodology that applies different
patterns presented to elicit and analyse security requirements for FI applications. The preliminary idea of
such methodology has been outlined in Section 5.
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